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Breaking Energy Path Dependencies
Amy L. Stein†
INTRODUCTION
Clean energy development faces an uphill battle.
Scholars and policymakers have spent extensive time
identifying the barriers to clean energy development, including
the intermittency of clean energy resources,1 the lack of a
framework for capturing the externalities of energy sources,2
the need for more transmission infrastructure,3 and the lack of
a utility business model that comports with efficiency and selfgeneration.4 Beyond these barriers, clean energy development
must combat over one hundred years of institutional “stickiness”
associated with the legal and regulatory framework governing
energy derived from fossil fuels.5
© Amy L. Stein, 2017. The author has not granted rights to reprint this
article under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please
contact the author directly for reprint permission.
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I
am grateful to the participants of Columbia Law School’s Sabin Colloquium and the
participants of the Trager Symposium at Brooklyn Law School for their valuable
feedback, and to my tireless research assistants, Jared Pessetto, Joshua Rieger, and
Kate Leonard for their outstanding assistance.
1 Because renewable energy like solar and wind is not available at all times,
these resources can be more troublesome for grid operators when compared to baseload
fossil fuel sources that can provide electricity on demand.
2 See Joseph P. Tomain, The Politics of Clean Energy: Moving Beyond the
Beltway, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 299, 317–20 (2011–2012).
3 See Marcelino Madrigal & Steven Stoft, Transmission Expansion for
Renewable Energy Scale-Up: Emerging Lessons and Recommendations 4–5 (Energy &
Mining Sector Bd., Discussion Paper No. 26, June 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/EXTENERGY2/Resources/Transmission-Expansion-and-RE.pdf [https://perma.cc/X82
7-RNB5] (2011).
4 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of
Electricity Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 505, 542 (2005) (noting barriers to
renewable energy as (1) lack of certainty on carbon pricing; (2) expensive transactional costs
due to nascent market and non-uniform documentation; (3) ongoing fossil fuel subsidies;
and (4) narrow investment framework that limits opportunities to allocate capital to
renewable energy).
5 Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved the
Planet, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 417, 429 (2006) (stating that the greatest challenge facing
reform is the resistance of traditional energy to change—its “remarkable staying
power.”); Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817,
817, 818 (2000); see generally Peter J. Boettke et al., Institutional Stickiness and the
New Development Economics, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 331, 332 (2008).
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This article explores how path dependency theories can
inform the practical legal efforts to overcome such stickiness
and identifies the troublesome approaches to energy problems,
decision rules, and relationships governing energy law that are
perpetuating the fossil fuel energy industry. Additionally, it sets
forth a new framework for facilitating an evolution in logic and
creating positive feedback mechanisms to propel clean energy out
of its sticky history and into a more fluid twenty-first century.
Political scientists, sociologists, economists, and legal
scholars have long examined path dependency as a means of
understanding such “institutional stickiness.”6 Even a shallow
dip into the deep literature on path dependency, as this article
does, necessarily begins with some terminology. Early adopters
of path dependency theories focused on its applicability to slow
technological change7 and institutional change.8 The theories
were then adjusted to help explain the increasing returns
associated with institutional economics,9 to analyze the inertia
of political scenarios (historical frameworks),10 and to explain
biological processes (evolutionary frameworks).11 The terms and
understanding of the different parts of a path vary within each
framework, and even the concept of an institution is subject to
different interpretations.
This article further adapts these frameworks to the
rules governing electricity generation. It follows the work of
political science path dependency scholars, Professors Hall and
Deeg, in assuming that institutions are “the formal rules,
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that
structure the relationship between individuals in various units
of the polity and economy.”12 In short, they are the rules of the
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 7–9 and
accompanying text.
7 W.B. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 122, 130 (1989).
8 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
9 W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY (1994).
10 Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000); NORTH, supra note 8.
11 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607, 616 (2001).
12 PETER HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 19 (1986); see Richard Deeg, Institutional
Change and the Uses and Limits of Path Dependency: The Case of German Finance 14
(Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 01/6, 2001), http://
www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp01-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GNH-UFXL] (“An institutional
path exhibits an identifiable ‘logic,’ i.e., a distinct pattern of constraints and incentives
(institutions) generate typical strategies, routine approaches to problems and shared
decision rules that produce predictable patterns of behavior by actors. When actors are

2017]

BREAKING ENERGY PATH DEPENDENCIES

561

game that constrain the choices of the stakeholders involved.13
The one modification to this definition that may be necessary to
apply it to the clean energy transition is to expand institutions to
reflect the rules of game for both individuals and organizations.
By this, I mean that not only are individual stakeholders
constrained by the preexisting rules of the game, but that
organizations—such as regional transmission organizations and
utilities—are also similarly bound by the same institutions.
Institutional stickiness results when actors fail to break
from the preexisting path, “even when such [deviation] would
lead to a better overall outcome.”14 Sometimes referred to as the
“dominance of suboptimal regulation,” this stickiness is reflected
in the consistent choice of fossil fuel energy in the face of
alternative renewable energy.15 Although a minority may debate
whether investments in clean energy result in a better overall
outcome,16 it is hard to deny that clean energy results in lower
marginal fuel costs,17 lower carbon dioxide emissions,18 lower
criteria pollutant emissions,19 and less dependence on
unsustainable sources of energy.20 In contrast, renewable
resources are not finite, and they do not involve a reliance on
foreign energy sources (though the supply chain component for

confronted with new situations, they will resort to these strategies, routines, and
decision rules. Adaptations (i.e. institutional changes) to new situations that preserve
these elements of the paths’ preexisting logic constitute on-path or ‘bounded
innovation.’” (footnoted omitted)); see, e.g., Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path
Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO
L.J. 341, 349 (2009) (defining institutions as the “bodies (formal and informal) charged
by a society with making, administering, enforcing or adjudicating its laws or policies”).
13 Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World
Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT
17 (John Harriss et al. eds., 1995).
14 Colin Crouch & Henry Farrell, Breaking the Path of Institutional
Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism, 16 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 5, 5 (2004).
15 Edwin Woerdman, Path-Dependent Climate Policy: The History and Future
of Emissions Trading in Europe, 14 EUR. ENV’T 261, 265–66 (2004).
16 See Bjørn Lomborg, Funding Wind and Solar Energy Is Inefficient, THE BLOG
(Jan. 27, 2016, 10:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bjorn-lomborg/are-wind-andsolar-energy_b_9087586.html [https://perma.cc/36HD-A9EF].
17 Alex Gilbert, The Case for Natural Gas and Renewable Energy, SPARK
LIBRARY (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.sparklibrary.com/the-case-for-natural-gas-andrenewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/DKQ9-XESX].
18 See Renewables and Carbon Dioxide Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/renew_co2.cfm [https://perma.cc/
6AGF-8RPG].
19 See infra note 131.
20 Gregory C. Unruh, Escaping Carbon Lock-In, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 317, 317 (2002)
(noting policy action is inhibited in the face of known climate risk and the presence of “at
least cost-neutral, if not cost effective, technological alternatives”).
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some solar panels and lithium ion batteries are historically
dominated by Asian manufacturers).21
Although low oil and gas prices are driving much of the
continued reliance on fossil fuels,22 path dependency theories also
help to explain this reliance. As Professor Pierson has described,
path dependence generally involves three phases.23 The first and
last phases are defined by “critical junctures,” events that trigger
a move toward or away from a particular path.24 The middle
phase involves the period of positive feedback mechanisms that
reinforce movement along the path.
The United States’ first phase and its initial investment in
fossil fuel infrastructure made sense. The initial critical juncture
that set the country on the existing path was the discovery of
cheap and abundant oil and gas.25 The self-reinforcing
mechanisms have been in play since the mid-nineteenth
century.26 And for much of that time, these investments were the
“better overall outcome.”27 It is not surprising that fossil fuels
(coal, natural gas, and oil) “have made up at least 80% of the U.S.
fuel mix since 1900.”28
As society learns more about the negative externalities
associated with its dependence on fossil fuels and clean energy
technologies advance, the logic behind continued reliance on
21 DONALD CHUNG ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY MFG. ANALYSIS CTR., AUTOMOTIVE
LITHIUM-ION BATTERY (LIB) SUPPLY CHAIN AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS
24, (2015) https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/06/f23/Lithium-ion%20Battery%20CEM
AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z266-T6GQ].
22 See infra notes 110–112.
23 Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 76 (2000); see also Prado & Trebilcock, supra
note 10, at 351 (describing path dependency as reflecting “an initial set of choices,” the
“reinforcement . . . through ‘feedback effects’,” and “the degree to which switching costs
may preclude” exploration of better alternatives).
24 See, e.g., James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29
THEORY & SOC’Y 507, 513–15 (2000) (explaining the theory behind critical junctures). But
see Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory,
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL. 341, 343
(2007) (defining a critical juncture as the moment where the structural influences on
decision-making are “significantly relaxed” for a time to open up the range of options).
25 Thomas Covert et al., Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?, 30 J. ECON.
PERSP. 117, 121–26 (2016); Unruh, supra note 5, at 821 (noting the “very cheap cost of
gasoline” played a role in an “establishment of the ICE [internal combustion engine] as the
dominant design”).
26 See HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & ARNOLD R. DAUM, THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY: THE AGE OF ILLUMINATION 1859–1899, at 725–31 (1959) (chronicling how the
petroleum industry originated and flourished in the United States).
27 See Crouch & Farrell, supra note 14, at 5.
28 Fossil Fuels Have Made Up At Least 80% of U.S. Fuel Mix Since 1900, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2
1912 [https://perma.cc/93FP-JD9K] (“[T]hree fossil fuel sources—petroleum, natural
gas, and coal—have made up at least 80% of total U.S. energy consumption for more
than 100 years.”).
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fossil fuels becomes more vulnerable.29 Yet individual developers
investing in fossil fuels act in their own self-interest and
externalities mask the overall impacts of their energy
infrastructure choices. In the short-term, it is hard for developers
to deny themselves the immediate financial returns associated
with building new projects. For instance, TransCanada’s
Keystone XL Pipeline seeks to transport carbon-intensive tar
sands from Canada to Gulf Coast refineries, generating trillions of
dollars in revenues.30 It took President Obama’s denial of a critical
permit required for the Keystone XL pipeline to break that path.31
When President Trump rescinded the prior administration’s
denial in early 2017, however, he may have triggered a new
critical juncture for a path of expanded tar sands development.32
While theories to explain the positive feedback
mechanisms associated with path dependency have been well
explored,33 theories associated with breaking path dependency or
forcing critical junctures are more limited.34 One of the more inCovert et al., supra note 25, at 128–34.
Coral Davenport, Citing Climate Change, Obama Rejects Construction of
Keystone XL Oil Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/
us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-of-keystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html [https://perma.
cc/AJE7-3THN]; Daniel Tencer, Alberta Oil Sands Royalties to Bring In $1.2 Trillion over
35 Years: CERI, HUFF. POST CAN. (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/
03/27/alberta-oil-sands-royalties-ceri_n_1382640.html [https://perma.cc/JWC6-5VAU].
Although predicted revenues initially hovered around $1.2 trillion, more recent
projections are for a $7 billion loss for Alberta, Canada, due to low oil prices. Justin
Giovannetti, Low Oil Prices Could Cut Alberta Revenue by $7-Billion, Prentice Says,
GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/low-oil-priceswill-punch-huge-hole-in-alberta-budget-prentice-says/article22015643/ [https://perma.cc/3X
M5-JTPP].
31 DEP’T
OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST
DETERMINATION: TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL
PERMIT 2–3 (2015), https://2012-keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/2494
50.pdf [https://perma.cc/N48C-FMF6]. TransCanada now seeks $15 billion in damages
alleging the United States acted in violation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) by denying the permit. Ian Austen, TransCanada Seeks $15
Billion from U.S. over Keystone XL Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/01/07/business/international/transcanada-to-sue-us-for-blockingkeystone-xl-pipeline.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/JP36-CL4P].
32 See Courtney Norris, Trump Signs Order to Advance Keystone XL and
Dakota Pipelines, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:32 PM), http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/rundown/trump-signs-order-advance-keystone-xl-dakota-pipelines/ [https://perma.
cc/Y7EV-BUTD].
33 See, e.g., Path Dependencies, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
1196–97 (George Thomas Kurian ed., 2011) (“Many authors relate path dependence to
the idea of increasing returns.”); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence,
and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000).
34 But see Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building
Off-Ramps on the Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 354 (2013)
(providing off-ramp suggestions to “prevent another carbon lock-in”); Unruh, supra
note 20, at 320; Woerdman, supra note 15, at 66 (noting improvement in information
quality, decreasing set-up costs, and deteriorating effectiveness of the prior institution
as paths to “unlock” or “escape” from lock-in); see also James Mahoney, Path
29

30
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depth assessments relevant to electricity generation came from
Professor Unruh, who explored the combined technological and
institutional carbon lock-in that further entrenches fossil fuels
on a macro or system-wide level,35 as well as set forth suggestions
for unlocking this carbon lock-in.36 Even a thoughtful analysis
such as Professor Unruh’s, however, does not apply path
dependency theories specifically to the legal regime governing
electricity generation.
This article will continue on that quest, focusing on the
inertia associated with the rules of the game that apply to
electricity stakeholders. It will attempt to make the case for
investments in the lower carbon, lower cost, and more sustainable
clean energy over fossil fuel infrastructure through an
adjustment to the sticky decision rules and approaches that
dominate U.S. energy laws. The goal is to adjust the analysis to
remove the power of path dependency over the decision-making
process. In a sense, it might ask which path we would pick
given what we know now if we had a chance to start fresh
without being influenced by prior paths.
Part I will apply relevant path dependency theories to
the institutions and logic governing energy decisions to
demonstrate the significant stickiness associated with the selfreinforcing mechanisms of energy resources. Part II will provide
some examples of the current logic governing energy law and
show how the current approach to problems, relationship to
customers, and decision rules governing electricity can reinforce
historical fossil fuel paths. Part III will explore the viability of
internal and external forces that can function to alter the path of
energy infrastructure. Understanding how path dependency
shapes current energy policies will be critical in forging a new
path towards more sustainable energy practices.
I.

PATH DEPENDENCIES OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
SURROUNDING ENERGY

Path dependency theory has many variants,37 but the
theories and proposals set forth in this article are well
understood within the context of “increasing returns” path
dependence.38 Also known as “decreasing cost conditions”39 or
Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 507, 513–15 (2000) (explaining
the theory behind critical junctures).
35 Unruh, supra note 5, at 828.
36 Unruh, supra note 20, at 318–19.
37 See supra text accompanying notes 7–13.
38 Hathaway, supra note 11, at 607.
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“positive feedback loops,”40 increasing returns path dependence
has its roots in economic literature and has been used to
explain unrelenting market imperfections and the endurance of
monopolies.41 In the economy, increasing returns emerge
“primarily from four characteristics”: (1) large fixed costs; (2)
learning effects; (3) coordination effects; and (4) adaptive
expectations.42 When these characteristics are present in a
process, a step down one path decreases the cost, or increases the
benefit, of another step in the same direction, creating a positive
feedback loop (i.e. a controlling, self-reinforcing sequence).43
Decision-makers may later realize that the choices made at
critical junctures are in fact “suboptimal” but they remain “locked
in” to that path because the cost of changing course is too great.44
Energy infrastructure reflects all four of these path
dependence characteristics.45 First, there have been significant
up-front investments in fossil fuel infrastructure, making it more
expensive to reverse course than it is to stay on the existing one.
Often referred to as “carbon lock-in,”46 many scholars have noted
Id. at 608.
Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 732 (2000).
41 Id.
42 Hathaway, supra note 11, at 609.
43 Id.; Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 88 (2006) (“Selfreinforcement means that making a choice or taking an action puts in place a set of
forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained. With
positive feedbacks, an action or choice creates positive externalities when that same
choice is made by other people.”). See the QWERTY keyboard example, reflecting lockin of a less than superior keyboard configuration that is engrained in every computer
on the planet due to early adoption, self-reinforcing customer preferences, and the
increasing value the more people learned how to type with this keyboard. S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 213–14 (1995); see also Mahoney, supra note 34, at 523–24.
44 See Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 651 (1996) (noting that strong form path dependence involves real
public choice and information costs “because overcoming the incumbents is costly or
because we are not sure what to do, then we might regret how the [current] path
turned out, but still not change it”). Our fossil fuel path has created similar economic
incumbents, often investor-owned utilities, that are costly to overcome and uncertainty
that contributes to information costs. See Marc Allen Eisner, Private Environmental
Governance in Hard Times: Markets for Virtue and the Dynamics of Regulatory
Change, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 489, 503 (2011).
45 Reference to “energy infrastructure” focuses on electricity generators,
electricity transmission lines, oil and gas pipelines, and clean technologies related to
energy efficiency and the smart grid.
46 “Carbon lock-in” refers to the risk that current and ongoing investments in
carbon-based physical and social infrastructure and institutions will continue, by forces
of inertia, to commit us to carbon intensive energy systems and make it more difficult
to adopt renewable energy pathways. See EMILY ROCHON, GREENPEACE, FALSE HOPE:
WHY CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE WON’T SAVE THE CLIMATE (2008), http://www.
greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2008/5/false-hope.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9DS-2Y9X]. “‘Lock-in’ . . . is a vivid way to describe the entry of a
system into a trapping region . . . . When a dynamic economic system enters such a
39
40
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the positive feedback loops that have locked industrial
economies into fossil-fuel based technologies through codified
standards and financing for technological systems.47 Sizeable
front-end investments are also prominent in the electric
industry. “Significant investment must be made in plants and
equipment before production can begin. . . . [G]eneration plants
are expensive, costing millions of dollars at the beginning of the
twentieth century and hundreds of millions of dollars today.”48
In short, the cost of reversal is high.
Second, utilities and investors in energy infrastructure
are generally risk averse, and learning effects render innovative
clean energy investments more expensive.49 Risk-averse lending
institutions are less likely to invest in unknown technologies.50
Therefore, re-investment returns in already existing technology
creates a positive feedback that locks-in existing technology and
ultimately stifles innovation.51 Additionally, lock-in in one
industry can result in lock-in in competitive and complementary
industries, with each refusing to shift to a more efficient option
without assurances that other potential users will follow.52
region, it cannot escape except through the intervention of some external force, or shock,
that alters its configuration or transforms the underlying structural relationships . . . .”
Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for ‘Historical Economics’, in
EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS: PAST AND PRESENT 25 (Pierre
Garrouste & Stavros Ioannides eds., 2001).
47 See Unruh, supra note 5, at 827–28; Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective
Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
207, 234 (2012) (discussing RPS as a means to avoid the carbon lock-in associated with
high capital fossil fuel sources); John C. Dernbach, Achieving Early and Substantial
Greenhouse Gas Reductions Under a Post-Kyoto Agreement, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.
REV. 573, 591 (2008) (arguing that “[t]echnology lock-in may be the most important
reason short-term reductions contribute to long-term reductions”); see also MARILYN A.
BROWN ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., CARBON LOCK-IN: BARRIERS TO DEPLOYING
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES 70 (2007), https://www.acs.org/content/
dam/acsorg/policy/acsonthehill/briefings/solarenergy/report-carbon-lock-in.pdf [https://
perma.cc/82KC-EYUU]; Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 25,
33 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C795-NKED] (concluding that “mitigation actions need to start in the short term in order
to have medium- and longer-term benefits and to avoid lock-in of carbon-intensive
technologies”); Nigel Bankes, The Legal and Regulatory Issues Associated with Carbon
Capture and Storage in Arctic States, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 21, 32 (2012).
48 Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity
Markets, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 505 (2005).
49 David E. Dismukes & Gregory B. Upton, Jr., Economies of Scale, Learning
Effects and Offshore Wind Development Costs, 83 RENEWABLE ENERGY 61, 63 (2015)
(“Learning effects exist when cumulative past output is negatively related to the cost of
producing the next unit. In other words, more ‘experience’ in past production allows for
future production to occur more efficiently.”).
50 Unruh, supra note 5, at 823.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813, 819 (1998). Similarly, automobile plants may stay in a suboptimal location
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Similarly, learning effects incentivize energy actors to affirm
the institutions with which they are most familiar. Many in the
energy sector have been involved in the fossil fuel business for
generations.53 They may be reluctant to lose the advantage they
have from decades of institutional knowledge on fossil fuel
infrastructure to enter into unchartered territory of clean
energy infrastructure.54 A similar reluctance to change is
reflected in consumers who are more comfortable purchasing
an internal combustion engine vehicle than an electric vehicle
because the internal combustion engine is what they know and
the electric vehicle technology is unfamiliar.55
Third, coordination effects—similar to network effects—
exist in spades in energy infrastructure. The electric grid, for
instance, is more valuable the more interconnected it becomes.56
By way of example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has encouraged transmission providers to join together
into regional transmission organizations to take advantage of
the economies of scale and efficiencies of the interconnected
network.57 FERC noted that the “transmission facilities of any one
utility in a region are part of a larger, integrated transmission
system which, from an electrical engineering perspective, operates
as a single machine” and “any action taken by one transmission
provider can have major and instantaneous effects on the
transmission facilities of all other transmission providers.”58

because the cost of the transition may exceed the benefit unless the competitive and
complementary industries simultaneously make the same move.
53 See generally Christopher Helman, America’s Oil and Gas Billionaires,
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/03/04/
americas-oil-and-gas-billionaires/#52bf309041fe.
54 David Ferris & Nathanial Gronewold, Why the Oil Majors Are Backing
Away from Renewable Energy, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060006834 [https://perma.cc/NS9G-YU69]; see also Unruh, supra note 5, at 824
(noting the positive feedback provided by educational institutions that taught the
science and practice of new technologies and their development of skilled laborers in
the system). Conversely, these feedback mechanisms also serve as a disincentive to
invest in the cost of re-learning.
55 See generally John Axsen & Kenneth S. Kurani, Hybrid, Plug-In Hybrid, or
Electric-What Do Car Buyers Want?, 61 ENERGY POL’Y 532, 533–34 (2013) (showing
consumers are less likely to purchase electric vehicles because they are unfamiliar with
the technology). A further complication involves ego. The inability of users to perform
self-help on their electric vehicles compared to many users who can troubleshoot an
internal combustion engine also works against electric car purchases.
56 ISO/RTO COUNCIL, THE VALUE OF INDEPENDENT GRID OPERATORS 7 (2005),
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/media_room/press_releases/2005/isortowhitepaper_
final11112005.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KNZ-FDB7] (noting the benefits of interconnected
RTOs).
57 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Regional Transmission
Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999).
58 Id. at 32.
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Fourth, adaptive expectations can be seen with respect
to energy infrastructure. One scholar describes adaptive
expectations in the market arising as “increasing adoption
reduces uncertainty and both users and producers become
increasingly confident about quality, performance and
permanence.”59 As the electricity industry focuses “on existing
competencies and away from alternatives that could make their
present products obsolete,” consumers will see more incremental
improvements60 instead of large-scale adoption of new energy
technologies. One implication of this theory is that the first
individuals to react or make decisions have disproportionate
weight on public opinion and social behavior. Those who come
after these initial adopters must overcome the initial presumption
in favor of the status quo.61 People form their expectations of the
future based on what has happened in the past. Therefore, most
energy analysts assume that fossil fuel infrastructure will
continue to dominate the energy landscape, in part, because of its
long legacy of doing exactly that.62
But it is not the investments in infrastructure that are
the focus of this article. Instead, this article focuses on the rules
of the game governing decisions to invest in certain types of
electricity generation. The deep investment in fossil fuel physical
infrastructure is coupled with the less-discussed entrenchment of
the legal and regulatory infrastructure surrounding energy. In
this way, the focus here is not so much on “carbon lock-in,” but on
“institutional lock-in.” Making a choice to invest in fossil fuels
puts in place a set of corresponding institutions (“rules of the
game”) that encourage the choice to be sustained. “Relying on
those institutions is the mean by which organizations reduce
uncertainty and increase both the predictability and intelligibility

Unruh, supra note 5, at 820.
Id. at 821.
61 See Pierre Lemieux, Following the Herd, REGULATION, Winter 2003–2004,
at 17–21, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2003/12/v26n42.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB8R-LWC3].
62 Ferris & Gronewold, supra note 54; see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 9 (2016), http://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/W5C2-YZYE] (finding fossil
fuels will constitute 59% of the total energy demand in 2040 even with aggressive climate
policies); Fossil Fuels Have Made Up at Least 80% of U.S. Fuel Mix Since 1900, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=
21912 [https://perma.cc/9TWJ-FWSQ] (noting the predominance of fossil fuels “is likely
to continue into the future”); BP, BP ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 EDITION 5 (2016), https://
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2016/bp-energy-outlook2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F8J-RDNH] (finding that world energy use will continue to be
dominated by fossil fuels for the foreseeable future).
59
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of their actions to the whole field.”63 This article takes a first
plunge into the feasibility of changing the logic associated with
energy institutions and electricity institutions in particular.
What has impacted the strategies, the approaches to problems,
and the shared decision rules of the utilities, public utility
commissions (PUCs), and other stakeholders involved in
electricity generation decisions?
The legal regime governing the electricity industry has
remained relatively unchanged since the 1900s. Based on
principles of public utility law, electric utilities enjoyed
monopolies with near guaranteed rates of return in exchange for
service.64 This so-called “regulatory compact” was premised on
the mutual benefits provided between the state or regulator and
the investor-owned utility (IOU).65 Eventually, federal law began
to encourage competition among electricity generators.66 Even
though the world had changed in a way that resulted in many
more generation options, the law remained entrenched.
A watershed moment in the regulation of electricity took
place when scholars began to realize that the monopoly
justifications long applied to all aspects of the electricity
industry—generation, transmission, and distribution—were
overbroad.67 Regulations encouraged competition among
electricity generators. The government adopted an approach that
limited its monopoly treatment (coupled with open access
requirements) to the area where a natural monopoly existed:
transmission lines.68
63 Olivier Berthod, On Institutions, Paths, and Routes Set in Stone: The
Construction of a Bridge as a Case of Path Instantiation 22 (May 9, 2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Berlin), http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/servlets/MCRFile
NodeServlet/FUDISS_derivate_000000010011/OB_2011_Dissertation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L4RA-8GMY].
64 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1877); SEVERIN BORENSTEIN &
JAMES BUSHNELL, ENERGY INST. AT HAAS, THE U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AFTER 20
YEARS OF RESTRUCTURING 2 (2015), https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP
252.pdf [https://perma.cc/G22Z-7MXF].
65 BORENSTEIN & BUSHNELL, supra note 64, at 9.
66 Id. at 4–6.
67 TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 3–5 (1996); Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned from
Electricity Market Liberalization, ENERGY J., 2008, at 10–11, http://economics.mit.edu/
files/2093 [https://perma.cc/B7B3-7ZRN].
68 Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities; 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37, 385); Electric Competition, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/competition.asp [https://perma.
cc/MG89-4UWU] (last updated Oct. 21, 2014) (explaining the national policy of fostering
“competition in wholesale power markets”); BORENSTEIN & BUSHNELL, supra note 64,
at 4–6.
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The law may be ready for the next watershed moment.
Just as everyone had taken for granted the monopoly status of
generators, many today take for granted the fact that the rules,
assumptions, and values underlying energy decisions of the
past must be the ones to apply to the future. Applying path
dependency theories to the institutions governing energy prove
equally apt. Our century-old legal, economic, and regulatory
structures are thwarting innovation, and this article questions
whether these assumptions are still valid, as well as suggests
alternative means to alter the existing path.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC GOVERNING ENERGY LAWS

Scholars have long explored institutional logic as a means
of connecting actors to their institutions.69 “Institutional logic” is
often defined as “socially-constructed assumptions, values, and
beliefs that define formal and informal rules of behavior and
guide interpretation about why certain structures and practices
exist.”70 In other words, as Professor Deeg explains, the “logic” of
an institutional path includes “strategies, routine approaches to
problems and shared decision rules that produce predictable
patterns of behavior by actors.”71 Without endogenous or
exogenous change, energy actors will apply the same “logic” to
renewable energy as they apply to fossil fuels. This logic will
include the rules and standards embedded within the energy
industry, including those surrounding the regulatory compact,
public utility relationships, and a focus on least cost resources.
In this sense, the institutional logic (values and beliefs)
feeds into the development of institutions (rules of the game),
which subsequently structure the relationships between the
actual stakeholders. This part reveals some of the institutional
logic that governs decisions concerning electricity generation.72
Specifically, the institutional path of the U.S. electric system
69 Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional Logics, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 99–100 (Royston Greenwood et al.
eds., 2008), https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/matnat/ifi/INF9200/v10/readings/papers/
ThorntonOcasio.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ABC-CQLA] (“Institutional logics shape rational,
mindful behavior, and individual and organizational actors have some hand in shaping
and changing institutional logics . . . . By providing a link between institutions and
action, the institutional logics approach provides a bridge….” (internal citation omitted)).
70 Wesley D. Sine & Robert J. David, Environmental Jolts, Institutional Change,
and the Creation of Entrepreneurial Opportunity in the US Electric Power Industry, 32 RES.
POL’Y 185, 187 (2003); see also Thornton & Ocasio, supra note 69, at 100 (incorporating
historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices into their definition).
71 Deeg, supra note 12, at 14.
72 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. York et al., Converging Winds: Logic Hybridization in
the Colorado Wind Energy Field, 59 ACAD. MGMT. J. 579, 595 (2016).

2017]

BREAKING ENERGY PATH DEPENDENCIES

571

embodies an overall logic that can be characterized by at least
three key guiding principles: (1) an approach to problems
founded on the regulatory compact; (2) decision rules that
reflect a singular focus on least cost resources; and (3) values
that are based on risk aversion.
A.

Approach to Problems: Regulatory Compact

The first area where institutional logic dominates energy
institutions stems from the original “regulatory compact.”73 This
compact is not an actual written contract, but a common-law
conception developed by the courts as they began to negotiate
the boundaries of public utility law.74 The basic premise is that
the utility agreed to be regulated as a monopoly, with regulated
rates and a duty to serve all equally in exchange for an exclusive
service area.75 “[S]ince a utility provides essential services for the
well-being of society—both individuals and businesses—it is an
industry ‘affected with the public interest.’”76 This regulatory
compact has defined how stakeholders in the industry approach
problems. Its modern form entails an understanding that prices
will be established based on actual prudent costs and that there
will be sufficient incentives to maintain the proper amount of
electricity services for the customer.77
The regulatory compact remains a necessity to ensure
reliability in the electricity market. The 2016 Quadrennial
Energy Review provided to President Obama notes that “[t]his
regulatory compact legally binds IOUs and regulators into a
partnership based on reciprocal obligations.”78 State Public
Utilities Commissions (PUCs) still rely upon the regulatory
compact to guide their decisions.79 Courts have cited the
73 See Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. C OLO . L. R EV . 887,
901–03 (2016).
74 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state power to
regulate utilities).
75 See generally Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
76 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A
GUIDE 3 (2011), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricity
regulationintheus-guide-2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYN6-YUL8].
77 Letter from Ari Peskoe, Senior Fellow in Elec. Law, Harvard Environmental
Policy Initiative, to Quadrennial Energy Review Task Force, Office of Energy Policy &
Sys. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/Harvard-Environmental-Policy-Initiative-QER-Comment-There-Is-NoRegulatory-Compact.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXF5-XLE7].
78 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Energy on an Integrated Study of the
U.S. Elec. Sys. to Stakeholders 13 (Feb. 4, 2016), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/
02/f29/Second%20Installment%20Briefing%20Memorandum_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T3QR-5YMJ].
79 See, e.g., In re Application of Pinedale Nat. Gas, Inc., No. 30016-75-GR-14, 2015
WL 5695562, at *12–13 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Sept. 24, 2015) (The Wyoming PUC found
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regulatory compact theory approvingly as guidance for rendering
decisions.80 Beyond practitioners, scholars cite the regulatory
compact as beneficial to ensuring market reliability, innovation,
and economics.81 Additionally, economists rely upon the
regulatory compact theory when evaluating market conditions.82
The regulatory compact theory still guides regulators,
practitioners, academics, and economists; in short, the theory
remains integral to the energy market.
Despite its enduring nature, there are growing calls to
revise, remove, and retire the regulatory compact theory.83
Advocates put forth compelling reasons. Some note the decline of
the regulatory compact and others question its continued
usefulness in the face of a changing resource mix84 and changing
ownership models.85 Some states, like California and New York,
have modified their policies to provide incentives to invest in
new generation technologies, such as distributed solar energy,
while trying to maintain the regulatory compacts they are

that Pinedale Natural Gas, Inc. failed to fully honor the regulatory compact in the years
preceding their hearing.); In re Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co.’s Application for Approval and
Authority, No. 15-00083-UT, 2015 WL 5693647, at *50 (N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n.
Sept. 21, 2015) (The New Mexico Public Regulation Commission found that a hold harmless
mechanism was not consistent with wise regulatory practice; relying upon testimony in
which the witness references the regulatory compact.); In re Application of Haw. Elec. Light
Co., Inc., No. 2012-0164, 2015 WL 6864613, at *3, *6 (Haw. P.U.C. Nov. 4, 2015) (The
Hawaii Electric Light Company successfully argued its deferment of costs for a
geothermal project was supported by the regulatory compact, among other things.); In
re Petition for Rate Increase by Fla. Power & Light Co., No. 160021-EI, 2016 WL
4467441, at *59, *112–13 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 19, 2016) (Several witnesses
testified at a pretrial hearing that Florida Power & Light Company’s (FPL) request to
raise rates should be denied because FPL is providing no better quality of service than
what it is already required to provide under the regulatory compact.).
80 See, e.g., PacifiCorp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 103 P.3d 862, 871 (Wyo. 2004)
(“The ‘regulatory compact’ provides the fundamental basis for utility regulation.”); U.S.
Gypsum, Inc. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc., 735 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. 2000) (“The bedrock
principle behind utility regulation is the so-called ‘regulatory compact.’”).
81 See, e.g., Zachary Robock, Note, Economic Solutions to Nuclear Energy’s
Financial Challenges, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 501, 526 (2016) (advocating the use
of Integrated Resource Planning in Nuclear Energy as a means to further the goals of the
regulatory compact); Inara Scott, Incentive Regulation, New Business Models, and the
Transformation of the Electric Power Industry, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 319, 345
(2016) (relying on the regulatory compact makes sense for new emerging technology).
82 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 81, at 345 (“Barclays made headlines in 2014
when it downgraded the entire utility sector based on threats from residential solar,
storage, and the potential failure of the regulatory compact.”).
83 See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1643 n.106 (2014).
84 Paul DeCotis, New Regulatory Paradigm Needed Now to Support
Distributed Energy Resources, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2016, at 49–50; Memorandum
from Quadrennial Energy Review Task Force Secretariat & Energy Policy & Sys.
Analysis Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (July 7, 2014), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
2014/07/f17/portland_backgroundmemo_qer.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4BR-ZK7K].
85 Stein, supra note 73, at 961.
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assigned to uphold.86 In fact, forty-eight states have explored
reforming regulations in some form.87 One scholar has
suggested that “[i]n states that have chosen to restructure their
retail markets, there is no longer a regulatory compact.”88
Strict adherence to the regulatory compact results in
problems for utilities, regulators, and customers. Most
importantly, utility revenues are tied directly to the amount of
electricity used by consumers.89 This means that there is both an
incentive to build and a disincentive to invest in energy efficiency.
For every dollar spent on building new energy infrastructure, the
utilities earn a PUC-approved rate of return.90 This results in a
strong incentive to invest in expensive new supply side
infrastructure. The business model has been “invest in
equipment, turn the customers’ meters, earn a steady profit.”91
“The current system penalizes utilities with lost profits for every
kilowatt-hour not used, for every generator put on the customer
side of the meter, and for every contract they sign with an
independent renewable power producer.”92 In short, the basic
business approach used by much of America’s electric power
sector has changed little over the past one hundred years, and is
embedded with an incentive to build as opposed to conserve.
This logic on investment has led to significant setbacks
regarding energy efficiency. Many PUCs are concerned about
imposing increased costs on ratepayers to fund energy efficiency
programs.93 For example, the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission rejected Xcel Energy’s application to recoup the final
86 Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 115, 141–42 (2014–2015); Nadia Ameli et al., Can the US Keep the PACE?, A
Natural Experiment in Accelerating the Growth of Solar Electricity, 191 APPLIED ENERGY
163, 165 (2017) (“The CSI [California Solar Initiative] has a $2.4 billion budget to stimulate
the deployment of approximately 1940 MW of new solar capacity between 2007 and 2016
via solar rebates for residential, commercial, and utility-scale systems.”); Solar Financing
Options, N.Y. STATE, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/NY-Sun/
Customers/Solar-Financing-Options [https://perma.cc/LB2V-D4HH].
87 DeCotis, supra note 84, at 49.
88 Jay Morrison, Capacity Markets: A Path Back to Resource Adequacy, 37
ENERGY L.J. 1, 52 (2016).
89 ANDREW SATCHWELL ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., A
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZING CURRENT AND FUTURE ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATORY
AND BUSINESS MODELS 7–8 (2015), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-181246_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JMF-HHYN].
90 Id. at 9.
91 Ron Lehr & Bentham Paulos, Changing the Rules to Help Utilities
Embrace the Future, AM.’S POWER PLAN, http://americaspowerplan.com/2013/10/
changing-the-rules-to-help-utilities-embrace-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/3JTD-Z279].
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Bob Mercer, PUC Vote Reflects Possible Change Ahead in Philosophy
for Energy-Efficiency Incentives, AM. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://articles.aberdeennews.
com/2013-03-26/news/38049431_1_efficiency-puc-vote-kristie-fiegen [https://perma.cc/2
GAX-ATP3].
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$16.6 million from ratepayers for its $44.5 million SmartGridCity
program.94 The Colorado PUC backed the program by allowing
Xcel Energy to recoup costs through ratepayer’s bill payments, on
the condition that Xcel present an acceptable strategic plan and
sufficient projected customer benefits.95 In 2012, an
administrative judge held that this condition had not been met, as
the projected benefits were too speculative.96 The PUC determined
that the high costs and unproven benefits would place an
unjustified burden on the utility’s ratepayers.97 Energy efficiency
measures have also met some resistance in Pennsylvania, where
the state’s PUC rejected part of PECO Electric Company’s plan to
subsidize its energy efficiency program by reallocating money
between different segments of the state-mandated system.98 This
prompted concern from PUCs that utilities would move funds
away from upgrades to invest in consumer subsidies.99
In addition to profits that are tied directly to electricity
usage, the regulatory compact renders it difficult for the utility
to be open to new and innovative relationships with their
customers. Utilities are frenetic in whether they want to
penalize or embrace previously passive consumers of electricity
who are now active producers and consumers of electricity.100
To maintain the protectionism over utility profits, Arizona was
the first PUC to impose an additional charge on solar panel
owners.101 Idaho and other states soon followed, imposing fees
on solar panel owners.102 Utilities have taken issue with third-

94 Mark
Jaffe, PUC Rejects Xcel Bid to Collect $16.6 Million in
SmartGridCity Costs, DAILY CAMERANEWS (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.dailycamera.
com/news/ci_22839631/puc-rejects-xcels-bid-collect-16-6-million.html [https://perma.cc/
2RGJ-RKNX]. But see U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, SMART METER INVESTMENTS YIELD
POSITIVE RESULTS IN MAINE (2014), https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/Central_Maine_
Power_Case_Study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/63LV-BSG4].
95 Jaffe, supra note 94.
96 Id.
97 Id.; Mark Jaffe, Judge Rejects Xcel’s Request for $16.6 Million in
SmartGridCity Costs, DENVER POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/
01/17/judge-rejects-xcels-request-for-16-6-million-in-smartgridcity-costs/ [https://perma.
cc/EUQ6-7F74].
98 Matt Fair, Pa. PUC Rejects Part of PECO’s Energy Efficiency Plan, LAW360
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/419962/pa-puc-rejects-part-of-peco-s-energyefficiency-plan [https://perma.cc/F97Q-VLP6] (PECO had underspent money earmarked for
Phase I (meant for utility upgrades) of the plan, and attempted to reallocate those funds to
subsidize Phase II (consumer reimbursement) costs.).
99 Id.
100 See Stein, supra note 73, at 931–32.
101 Christopher Martin, Arizona Approves Grid-Connection Fees for Solar
Rooftops, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1115/arizona-regulators-impose-power-grid-fees-for-solar-roofs [https://perma.cc/7SR6-5ZY7].
102 Kaitlin Loukides, Idaho Power Proposes Costly Changes to Renewable
Energy, LOCAL NEWS 8 (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.localnews8.com/news/idaho-power-
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parties that are selling clean electricity in their “exclusive
service areas,” with five states banning third-party power
purchase agreements (PPAs) in a protectionist posture.103 They
have even challenged electric vehicle chargers as being
“providers of electricity” in contradiction to the utility’s exclusive
service area.104 Similarly, in addition to PUC resistance, some
utilities have actively refrained from engaging with energy
efficiency. FirstEnergy in West Virginia, for instance, has
completely rejected energy efficiency as an alternative.
“FirstEnergy’s ‘Resource Plan’ states that ‘demand side resource
options are not a viable solution capable of meeting Mon Power’s
obligations . . . [as they] do not address energy shortfalls as
significant as the shortfall faced by Mon Power.’”105
Both energy efficiency and renewable energy are important
components of a move to a lower carbon grid, but the tensions with
the regulatory compact make this transition difficult. In short, the
regulatory compact of old needs to be reevaluated in light of the
needs to transition to a lower carbon grid. As Professor Roe has
questioned, “if an institution, legal rule, or dominant practice arose
to resolve a problem that is irrelevant today, then it should get less
of a presumption of continuing utility.”106
B.

Decision Rules: PUC Rules

A second component of the electricity logic that restricts
movement toward alternative resources is the assumption that a
focus on security-constrained economic dispatch will provide the
appropriate mix of electricity generation to minimize consumer
costs and maintain reliability. For instance, one dominant theme
of electricity ratemaking is that the utilities and the PUC invest
proposes-costly-changes-to-renewable-energy_20160825013949677/57608543 [https://
perma.cc/U4WX-A42S].
103 DSIRE, 3RD PARTY SOLAR PV POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT (PPA) (2015),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3rd-Party-PPA_
0302015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YL5-XBP8].
104 See Phase 2 Decision Establishing Policies to Overcome Barriers to Electric
Vehicle Deployment and Complying with Public Utilities Code Section 740.2,
Rulemaking 09-08-009, Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California (Cal. P.U.C. 2009).
105 James Van Nostrand, FirstEnergy’s Proposed Deal on Harrison Plant: A
Good Deal for Its Shareholders, and a Really Bad Deal for Mon Power Ratepayers, W. VA.
UNIV. COLL. OF LAW CTR. FOR ENERGY & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 5, 2013), http://energy.
law.wvu.edu/energy-forward-blog/2013/05/05/firstenergy-s-proposed-deal-on-harrisonplant-a-good-deal-for-its-shareholders-and-a-really-bad-deal-for-mon-power-ratepayers
[https://perma.cc/KG7Y-YBT6] (alteration in original) (quoting Join Petition for Approval
of a Generation Resource Transaction and Related Relief, at 56 (W. Va. Charleston Pub.
Serv. Comm’n Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.psc.state.wv.us/scripts/WebDocket/View
Document.cfm?CaseActivityID=357234&NotType=%27WebDocket.
106 Roe, supra note 44, at 568.
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in the least-cost resources.107 Electric utilities operate stategranted monopolies and are regulated by state utility
commissions. Most state PUCs are obligated by law to require
that utilities provide power at the lowest cost.108 Least-cost
planning (LCP) is a process of examining all electricity-saving and
electricity-producing options to select a mixture of options that
minimizes total consumer cost, often including consideration of
environmental controls and other responsibilities.109
The most overwhelming “logic” is that developers will
invest in the infrastructure with the greatest financial returns
(e.g., lowest cost investment for the highest financial returns).
Applying this existing logic, energy actors will continue to invest
in fossil fuel infrastructure (e.g., fossil-fueled power plants and
oil and gas pipelines). Natural gas prices are near an all-time
low,110 application of horizontal drilling to shale formations
temper prior worries about a finite supply of fossil fuels, and oil
prices are so low that oil-dependent states are struggling to keep
their heads above water.111 Low oil and gas prices render it
difficult for alternative energy sources to compete.112
Applying this logic, renewable energy will often lose. Even
though renewable energy has zero fuel costs compared to natural
107 Patrick Bean & David Hoppock, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities 3
(Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper No. NI WP 13-05, 2013), https://
nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_13-05.pdf [https://perma.
cc/A2EV-APJ3] (“To accomplish this goal, electricity generation planners typically use
scenario analysis to account for a range of potential futures. However, determining optimal
investments is difficult if least-cost investments vary widely across scenarios, as is often the
case during a time of unprecedented uncertainty in the industry and given a wide range of
potential market futures. An investment that is least cost in one scenario (or future) may be
high cost and high risk in another.”).
108 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC
DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), http://www.
ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL
G2-Z7CX].
109 ECONORTHWEST & PARSONS, BRINCKERHOFF, QUADE & DOUGLASS,, LEASTCOST PLANNING: PRINCIPLES APPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 1–6 (1995), http://www.vtpi.org/
LCPpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSC9-KS6T] (“The term least-cost planning developed
out of the electric utility industry as a method for selecting the most cost-effective measures
for meeting projected increases in demand for electricity. . . . Least-cost planning is a process
that includes the ideas of public involvement; expansion of alternatives to include serious
evaluation of no-build alternatives like demand management; inclusion of all costs,
including those difficult to quantify like environmental damage and risk; an explicit
treatment of uncertainty; a portfolio of options form which solutions can be pulled in
response to changing conditions.”).
110 Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/
rngwhhda.htm [https://perma.cc/DQG7-LP5T] (2015 price of $2.62/per million BTU
compared to 1998 all-time low of $2.09).
111 Challenges and Opportunities for Oil and Gas Development in Different Price
Environments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 114th Cong. 4 (2016)
(statement of Jason E. Bordoff, Founding Director, Center on Global Energy Policy).
112 See Severin Borenstein, The Private and Public Economics of Renewable
Electricity Generation, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 69–73 (2012).
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gas, coal, and oil, these cost-benefits are offset by high sunk costs
associated with renewable infrastructure investments compared
to the amount of electricity produced. On paper, the fossil fuel
option will almost always be the “least cost” option under the
current energy policies. The lowest-cost option—especially with
the limited time horizons and high discount rates used by most
PUCs—is usually the status quo. The overall competitiveness
of different generating technologies is often expressed through
a levelized cost of electricity (LCOE).113 The LCOE of a combined
cycle natural gas plant is almost twenty dollars per megawatt
cheaper than that of a utility-scale solar PV array, but just a few
dollars cheaper than a wind farm.114 The LCOE does not reflect
all factors that are relevant to investment decisions, including
the utilization rate and the existing resource mix, but it provides
a fundamental rationale for why investors often prefer
investments in natural gas as opposed to renewables. And it
explains why PUCs are often more inclined to approve
investments in natural gas over renewable projects.
Despite solar projects closing the gap with fossil fuel
plants in LCOE, solar projects remain more costly than fossil
fuel plants scheduled to come online in 2018 and 2022.115
Compared to natural gas electricity generators and oil refineries,
which can be located close to existing natural gas and oil
pipelines, large-scale renewable energy sources also generally
require expensive transmission lines to connect to the existing
grid.116 Similarly, although overall costs per kilowatt-hour for
solar PV and wind in 2016 were lower than any other year, most
fossil fuel technologies provide lower costs and more energy
output than the renewable alternatives.117
113 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED
COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016, at 1, 6
tbl.1a (2016), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo16/pdf/electricity_generation_2016.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5YBY-QQ3W] (“It represents the per-kilowatthour cost (in real
dollars) of building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life and
duty cycle. Key inputs to calculating LCOE include capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and
variable operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, financing costs, and an assumed
utilization rate for each plant type.”).
114 Id. at 6 tbl.1a.
115 Id. at 6 tbl.1a, 12 tbl.A1a.
116 See Alborz Nowamooz, Recent Developments, Inadequacy of Transmission
Lines: A Major Barrier to the Development of Renewable Energy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L.
& POL’Y J. 176, 178–80 (2008).
117 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COST AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF
NEW GENERATING TECHNOLOGIES, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 (2017), http://www.
eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/assumptions/pdf/table_8.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5YL-6WHT]. In
2013, the average construction costs per kilowatt-hour for natural gas and petroleum
liquids were $965 and $765, respectively, compared to the costs of solar PV, $3,705,
and wind, $1,895. Construction Cost Data for Electric Generators Installed in 2013,
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Constrained by these least-cost principles, PUCs have
tempered some important innovations for the grid. One of the
more prominent innovations is the use of renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs). RPSs are state-specific and require the
utilities within the state to procure a specific amount of
electricity from renewable sources. These innovations seem to be
preferred over other public policies and financial incentives, with
twenty-nine states, Washington, D.C., and three U.S. territories
having already adopted an RPS.118 The structure of renewable
energy requirements has proven to be a double-edged sword in
Nevada, however, where the PUC rejected five contracts
between NV Energy and renewable developers to buy more
than one hundred megawatts of renewable energy.119 Because
NV Energy could not show that these contracts were necessary
for it to meet the requirement that it get twenty-five percent of
its power from renewable sources, the PUC rejected them.120
The PUC held that the acceptance of these contracts would
result in an unjustified price increase for consumers.121 In
effect, the PUC decision reformulated the state’s RPS as a
ceiling over which Nevada utilities were seemingly prohibited
from procuring renewable generation.122
A second innovation that is struggling in the face of PUC
decision rules are those governing the eligibility of renewable
projects. In another instance of PUC obstruction, the Idaho
Public Utilities Commission recently solidified new rules that
severely limit the size of renewable energy projects that qualify
for preferred power purchase rates mandated under the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA).123 PURPA was
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/generator
costs/archive/2013/ [https://perma.cc/2QXD-HNH2].
118 DSIRE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES (2016), http://ncsolar
cen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BU6N-6LVZ].
119 Jennifer Robison, PUC Rejection of Contracts Irks NV Energy, Developers,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (July 23, 2011), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/energy/pucrejection-contracts-irks-nv-energy-developers [https://perma.cc/Z3BE-87YR].
120 Id.; NV ENERGY, PORTFOLIO STANDARD ANNUAL REPORT FOR COMPLIANCE
YEAR 2014 (2015), http://cesa.org/assets/2015-Files/NV-Energy-2014-RPS-ComplianceReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULH8-RCYQ].
121 Robison, supra note 119 (“But Commissioner Rebecca Wagner said
ratepayers would be on the hook for unnecessary development costs if NV Energy buys
more renewable energy than legally required.”).
122 The current language of the Nevada statute establishing RPS standards
supports the idea that once the 25% goal is reached, PUCs will not be accountable for
achieving any greater percentage of renewables. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.7821 (2013).
123 Idaho Public Utilities Commission Sets New Rules for Renewable Power
Projects, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-north
west-news/index.ssf/2012/12/idaho_public_utilities_commiss.html [https://perma.cc/J7H
P-LN5S].
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meant to promote the use of renewable energy by allowing
qualified facilities a guaranteed market and a more relaxed
regulatory path.124 While Idaho does not have an RPS on the
books,125 the massive wind potential in the region makes the PUC
decision a critical blow to the development of wind resources in
the state. The rulemaking in question began nearly a decade ago
when Idaho utilities, faced with an influx of wind development,
petitioned the Idaho PUC to suspend their obligation to enter into
power purchase agreements with qualifying wind production
facilities.126 Though the Idaho PUC stated that it remained
committed to its obligation to promote renewable development,127
the lower eligibility cap ensured that a significant portion of
wind developers in Idaho would be unable to attain power
purchase agreements at the preferable rates under PURPA,
substantially inhibiting the penetration of wind into the state’s
energy market.128
The least-cost logic governing electricity generation
decisions may hinder the move toward a cleaner energy future.
The markets that drive these low fossil fuel prices fail to account
for a number of externalities—both positive and negative. For
instance, while some proclaim the benefits of natural gas as a
bridge fuel129—including reduced emissions as compared to coal
generation130—there is no denying that the emissions benefits
are not as dramatic as if the nation was substituting coal with
renewables.131 These market failures may provide at least a
partial explanation for why renewable energy continues to find
it difficult to forge a new path forward to support more of the
United States’ electricity needs. Alternatively, if the positive
124 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), ENERGY.GOV,
https://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/otherregulatory-efforts/public [https://perma.cc/BQX3-ZAEX].
125 See DSIRE, supra note 118.
126 In re Windland Incorporated’s Petition for Stay of Comm’n Order No.
29839, at 1 (Idaho P.U.C. Aug. 9, 2005).
127 See Idaho Public Utilities Commission Sets New Rules for Renewable
Power Projects, supra note 123 (“Marsha Smith and Mack Redford said their ruling’s
rationale was two-fold: to continue Idaho’s support of renewable energy, while
shielding utility ratepayers from undue price hikes.”).
128 Id. (“Boise-based Exergy Development Group suspended hundreds of
millions in Idaho wind and biogas projects, blaming uncertainty over what the rules
would eventually look like for scaring off its financiers.”).
129 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in
the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 338, 341 (2013).
130 Douglas Fischer, Switch to Natural Gas Slashes Power Plant Pollution,
SCI. AM. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/switch-to-naturalgas-slashes-power-plant-pollution/[https://perma.cc/KNV4-3VWB].
131 See Michael K. Heiman & Barry D. Solomon, Power to the People: Electric
Utility Restructuring and the Commitment to Renewable Energy, 94 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 94, 94–95, 100–05 (2004).
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externalities of renewable energy and the negative externalities
of fossil fuels are internalized in the price, the markets may
produce a new breed of “least-cost resources”—those that impose
the least environmental cost.
Changing this logic is not novel; many stakeholders
have begun the process of doing so. In fact, the Obama
administration developed a social cost of carbon (SCC) to assist
internalizing these externalities in federal rulemaking.132 This
SCC has been upheld by the Seventh Circuit,133 but has yet to
be adopted uniformly across state regulatory bodies. Use of the
SCC would more accurately account for carbon’s negative
externalities not currently reflected in its pricing, but its value
to the Trump administration is questionable.
As a result of this least-cost logic, despite the advantages
of renewable energy, investments in fossil fuel infrastructure
have dwarfed investments in clean energy infrastructure (e.g.,
renewable facilities and energy efficient technologies). From a
pure neoclassical efficiency perspective, an economist may note
that coal and natural gas reflect the type of equilibrium expected
of generation choices in an efficient market.134 As the country
invests in more natural gas production and pipelines, however,
it commits itself to a long-term relationship with natural gas.
C.

Values: Risk Aversion to Clean Energy Investments

A third logic that permeates the energy institutions is
risk aversion. PUCs are risk averse, utilities are risk averse, and
even legislatures can be risk averse. Even when necessary
adjustments become apparent,135 stakeholders will drag their feet
132 Robert Walton, Court Upholds Obama’s Social Cost of Carbon Accounting for
Federal Regulations, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/courtupholds-obamas-social-cost-of-carbon-accounting-for-federal-regulati/424260/ [https://perma.
cc/ZU83-D9QZ].
133 Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy., 832 F.3d 654, 678 (7th Cir. 2016).
134 Electricity in the U.S., ENERGY KIDS U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/kids/energy.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states-basics [https://perma.
cc/4ZBC-E25J] (showing that for the first time in history, natural gas has tied coal for our
largest source of generation, pushing coal out of its historic position of dominance). This shift
is largely due to a combination of factors, including historically low natural gas prices and
increasing pressure to regulate environmental emissions, including greenhouse gases, of
which coal generates much more. See id.
135 As one example, see NERC’s reserve margins. NERC noted at its recent
technical conference that they have historically had only two factors that contribute to
their creation: weather and performance (uncertainty and performance of the generator
units), a historical remnant that is no longer reflective of the multitude of factors that
affect reserve margins. Thomas Burgess, Vice President and Director of Reliability
Assessment and Performance Analysis, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Remarks at
FERC Reliability Technical Conference Panel I: 2015 State of Reliability Report 2
(June 4, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.nerc.com/news/testimony/Testimony
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to act because a continued failure of the status quo is associated
with less political fallback than a new failure.136 Because the
stakeholders are familiar with fossil fuel energy, there is much
less concern associated with these projects compared to
alternative energy projects. PUC decision-making thus reflects
a bias toward fossil fuel projects.
Investments in alternative energy technologies—even
those with minimal risk—are viewed as extraordinarily risky
while investments in fossil fuel projects are viewed as acceptable
risks. The Florida Public Service Commission’s (PSC) investment
in Oklahoma natural gas fields reflects but one example of a
risky endeavor that was deemed to satisfy the PSC’s risk
profile.137 Florida’s largest utility, Florida Power & Light (FPL),
became the first in the nation to convince the state regulators
to approve the Woodford Project, a natural gas production project
in southeastern Oklahoma.138 FPL’s plan sought to create a longterm physical hedge against its initial investment that recovers
the investment through customers’ fuel costs.139 The PSC
approved this project despite the fact that it was demonstrated to
cost ratepayers $750 million per year.140 In 2014, this same PSC
voted “to cut ‘demand-side management’ programs” for the
following five years “slash[ing] energy efficiency goals and
end[ing] solar rebates to customers after 2015.”141 The judicial
system intervened to break this path, with the Florida Supreme
Court rejecting the Public Service Commission’s approval of
FPL’s cost recovery plan because the commission lacked the

%20and%20Speeches/FERC%20Technical%20Conference%20June%204%202015%20Te
stimony%20Burgess%20Panel%20I.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6FE-ZC57]).
136 See for example, former Republican Congressman, Bob Inglis, who lost his
bid for reelection after telling a radio show announcer that he believed in climate
change. Jason M. Breslow, Bob Inglis: Climate Change and the Republican Party,
FRONTLINE (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/bob-inglis-climatechange-and-the-republican-party/ [https://perma.cc/U4A3-A6XC]; see also Rolf Wüstenhagen
et al., Social Acceptance of Renewable Energy Innovation: An Introduction to the Concept, 35
ENERGY POL’Y 2683, 2685–86 (2007).
137 In re Fuel and Purchased Power Cost Recovery Clause with Generating
Performance Incentive Factor, Order No. PSC-15-0038-FOF-EI (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
2015), http://www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/15/00195-15/00195-15.pdf [https://perma.
cc/F7JG-NBAE] (finding that “minimizing price volatility produces customer benefits”).
138 See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Supreme Court Rejects FPL Attempt to Have
Customers Pay for Risky Investment, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 19, 2016), http://www.
tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/florida-supreme-court-rejects-fpl-attempt-tohave-customers-pay-for-risky/2278080 [https://perma.cc/3XSP-V4JM].
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Doreen Hemlock, Florida Regulators Cut Energy-Efficiency Goals, End
Rebates for Solar Panels, SUNSENTINEL (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/
business/consumer/fl-energy-efficiency-decision-20141125-story.html.
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statutory authority to approve it under Florida statute.142 FPL
forecasted that the $191 million plan would incur a $5.8 million
loss in 2015 due in part to lower production and gas prices.143
As a textbook example of checks and balances, the legislative
system has countered with Senator Bean’s proposal to amend
the PSC’s statutory authority to “include the approval of cost
recovery for certain gas reserve investments.”144
As the Florida PSC considered FPL’s plan for approval
during 2014, Duke Energy also considered investing in shale
gas reserves.145 Ultimately, Duke Energy invested in natural
gas pipelines, purchased Piedmont Natural Gas, and planned
construction of natural gas power plants to replace coal-fired
power plants in the Carolinas and Florida.146 It is possible Duke
Energy reconsidered its investment in shale gas reserves based
upon FPL’s experience with the Woodford Project.
In short, institutional processes used by regulatory
agencies—including when to act by rulemaking as opposed to by
adjudication, how to engage the public, and how to collect and
share data relevant to policymaking—greatly shape the
substantive outcomes of important regulatory proceedings. The
emerging question will be how best to study institutional
processes and the logic that dominates these energy decisions.
These anecdotal examples barely scratch the surface of the logic
governing electricity generation, but they reflect the larger trends
dictating electricity generation decisions.
III.

SHAPING THE PATH: EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE
STICKINESS OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Scholars have distinguished between exogenous and
endogenous forces that can alter existing paths. Some scholars
focus on path dependent case studies to show how one massive
critical juncture can push towards a new path, often through
142 Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Graham, 191 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. 2016); see
Klas, supra note 138.
143 William R. Levesque, FPL’s Fracking Investment Is a Money Loser So Far,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/
fpls-fracking-investment-is-a-money-loser-so-far/2242478 [https://perma.cc/7Z4P-GH73].
144 S.B. 1238, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
145 See Mark Chediak & Harry R. Weber, Duke Energy Sees Potential Shale
Gas Investment, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-11-11/duke-energy-sees-potential-shale-gas-investment [https://perma.cc/6TJW-Z5JS].
146 Rebecca Smith, Duke Energy to Buy Piedmont Natural Gas for $4.9 Billion,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/duke-energy-to-buy-piedmontnatural-gas-for-4-9-billion-1445858176 [https://perma.cc/FSP8-NU7F]; Duke Energy
Focused on Customers, Future Strategy, CEO Tells Shareholders, DUKE ENERGY (May 5,
2016), http://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-focused-on-customers-futurestrategy-ceo-tells-shareholders [https://perma.cc/J7CN-8DC6].
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exogenous forces.147 Others, however, argue that paths can also
be changed through a more evolutionary process,148 often through
endogenous forces. Some scholars have suggested that a mixture
of endogenous and exogenous forces can lead to a series of pathchanging initiatives.149 This section explores the viability of
internal and external forces that can function to shift the fossil
fuel energy decision path to a clean energy decision path. It
focuses on three primary mechanisms: (1) facilitating an evolution
in the logic applied to energy infrastructure decisions; (2)
minimizing the feedback effects associated with fossil fuel
infrastructure; and (3) increasing the feedback effects associated
with clean energy infrastructure.
A.

Facilitate an Evolution in Logic

If the logic that has been applied to energy systems for
so long is in need of change, the first focus should be on how to
kick-start such an evolution. Amory Lovins and Joe Tomain
have advocated for a change from a “hard path” to a “soft path”
for energy infrastructure.150 Lovins characterized the hard path
“as involving large-scale, capital-intensive, fossil-fuel, and
nuclear plants” and rejected its commitment “to the idea that
the more energy that a society produces and consumes, the
more economically healthy that society will be.”151 Electric
transmission and distribution facilities, telecommunications

147 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641 n.161,
665 (2001) (“Like biological entities, historically evolved institutions are “sticky”—they
tend to resist change until an external crisis requires it.”); Unruh, supra note 20, at
321 (noting that in large and stable organizations, exogenous change is much more
likely since insiders are often content with the status quo); Rebecca Smith, Duke
Energy to Buy Piedmont Natural Gas for $4.9 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/duke-energy-to-buy-piedmont-natural-gas-for-4-9-billion-144
5858176 [https://perma.cc/V3P9-VKBU].
148 See, e.g., Daniel Béland, Policy Change and Health Care Research, 35 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 615, 620 (2010) (“Thelen’s How Institutions Evolve (2004)
formulates a theory of institutional and policy change. A central contribution of that book
is a critique of the ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ grounded in the belief that long
episodes of inertia follow rare ‘critical junctures.’ As this assumes, such critical junctures
feature exogenous shocks that provoke path-departing change. Thelen claims that most
forms of policy change occur outside such episodes. Thus, to truly understand policy
change, scholars should pay close attention to incremental but potentially transformative
change occurring between critical junctures.”).
149 Deeg, supra note 12, at 11 (“[A]n exogenous shock is not the only way a path
gets disrupted, i.e., that a process of fundamental institutional change is initiated.”).
150 Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
65 (1976); Tomain, supra note 5, at 423.
151 Tomain, supra note 5, at 423.
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equipment, and oil and gas pipelines have long lives.152 “Once a
T&D [transmission and distribution] system is created to link
centralized generation with distribution, it becomes an
embedded ‘hard’ infrastructure.”153 “Like a highway grid, once
configured, locational and use patterns that grow up around
that grid make it more difficult later to reroute those electric
highways. ‘Hard’ infrastructure choices of any kind, once
embedded in the physical and distributional fabric of a country,
are not easily removed or altered.”154
The existing hard path of energy infrastructure depends
on a focus on supply-side resources to satisfy the nation’s growing
electricity demand. Because of this, both Lovins and Tomain have
encouraged movement towards a soft path defined by five
defining characteristics: “increased use of renewable energy,
diversity of energy supplies, increased use of flexible and less
intense technologies, matching the production of energy to the
scale of its use, and matching energy quality to end use needs.”155
This section explores how the logic applied to electricity
generation can be adjusted towards a softer path.
As efforts to alter the fundamental relationships between
energy actors take hold, the energy players may react differently
in a manner that constitutes an endogenous erosion of the hard
path.156 A first dynamic that may change the logic is a shift from
supply side to demand side resources. Historically, grid operators
have been dependent on utilities or merchant plants to construct
sufficient supply-side resources.157 But as more demand-side
resources become valuable contributors to reliability of the grid,
previously passive customers are becoming active participants in
the grid.158 To better enable these demand-side resources, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has taken steps to
support these resources, further changing the supply-side
dynamics.159 Increasing reliance on demand-side resources to
152 See, e.g., Rose Ragsdale, Big Risk, Bigger Rewards: Life Expectancy Climbs
as Pipeline Ages, PETROLEUM NEWS (Feb. 14, 2010), http://www.petroleumnews.com/pn
truncate/842644601.shtml [https://perma.cc/QHL4-WXDA] (noting the Trans-Atlantic
Oil Pipeline’s lifespan of almost sixty years).
153 Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of
Environmental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choices for Future Power
Development, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 125–36 (2009).
154 Id. at 126.
155 Tomain, supra note 5, at 436.
156 See, e.g., Deeg, supra note 12, at 22 (discussing how endogenous factors
affected German energy actors during the twentieth century).
157 BORENSTEIN & BUSHNELL, supra note 64.
158 See Stein, supra note 73, at 908.
159 See, e.g., Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,522
(Nov. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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meet the electricity needs may alter existing relationships of
stakeholders and shift the supply-side “logic.”
Second, the logic applied to fossil fuel infrastructure may
be reshaped by a shift in thinking between large, commercialscale provision of electricity and smaller-scale distributed
generation. The investment model of distributed generation is
drastically different from that of large-scale generation. For
instance, although new large-scale generation is generally paid
for by investor-owned utilities (that seek reimbursement through
Public Utility Commission-approved rates paid by customers) or
private merchant plants (that seek reimbursement through
competitive wholesale markets), small-scale distributed
generation is usually paid for directly by the customers
themselves.160 The resulting changes in “logic” may also affect the
existing dynamics in ways that alter the existing path. The public
interest—as expressed by both government policy and consumer
preferences—demands that distributed generation and energy
efficiency should be encouraged, not stifled.161 If large utilities are
not investing more in renewable energies themselves, frustrated
consumers may increasingly engage in self-supply of renewables.
Third, the logic may be shaped by a shift among
developing nations. 1.3 billion people are without power,162 and
as Africa and Asia move to increase the standard of living, they
provide unique entry-level initial critical junctures for clean
energy to proliferate. Professor Ferrey has also noted the
pending massive electrification, where “developing nations will
choose whether to deploy conventional fossil-fired or sustainable
renewable options to generate electricity. Once installed, those
facilities will remain in place, [whether they] contribut[e] to
global warming or not, often for 40 years and in many cases
longer.”163 Developing nations provide opportunities for clean
energy path dependency to be reinforced.
Fourth, the logic may be shaped by the growing consensus
surrounding climate change. Many scholars agree that path
dependency, no matter the context, can be broken when “windows
160 See, e.g., John V. Barraco, Comment, Distributed Energy and Net Metering:
Adopting Rules to Promote a Bright Future, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 375–76
(2014) (explaining how Arizona investor-owned utilities seek reimbursement from the
Arizona Corporation Commission); Kristin Bluvas, Comment, Distributed Generation:
A Step Forward in United States Energy Policy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1589, 1601–03 (2007)
(explaining how customers control and pay for distributed generation).
161 Bluvas, supra note 160, at 1602–11.
162 U.N. Secretary General, Sustainable Energy for All: A Vision Statement by
Ban Ki-moon Secretary General of the United Nations, 2 (Nov. 2011), http://www.se4
all.org/sites/default/files/l/2013/09/SG_Sustainable_Energy_for_All_vision_final_clean.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4F5-JLXX].
163 Ferrey, supra note 153, at 125.
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of opportunity” present themselves.164 After paraphrasing
Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Keleman’s concept of “critical
junctures,”165 Jacob Katz Cogan concludes: “[t]here is no doubt
that change (at least of the kind with which the authors are
concerned) occurs in response to a felt need by critical actors to
reconcile existing law and institutions with new realities. To use
the biological analogy, change is adaptation.”166 Political actors
that exert their power in ways to further movement along the
given path also can impact the choice in path.167 Climate change,
for instance, has shown it has the potential to enlist political
actors as powerful forces to alter a path.168 Whereas the Obama
administration committed the United States to the new climate
change reality, the Trump administration is unlikely to be a
force that embraces this reality to continue on the climate
change path.169
Lastly, the changing demographics of the United States
may result in a shift in logic. Seventy-five million baby boomers
are on the verge of retirement and many, if not most, of them
are dependent on their investments for retirement savings.170
Their current investment portfolios will likely mirror those
composed in the past, which were likely to include significant
investment in fossil fuel energy infrastructure. Through the
mid-1980s, U.S. government policy made investment in oil and
gas development extremely attractive by offering significant tax

164 See, e.g., Katherine Boothe, How the Pace of Change Affects the Scope of
Reform: Pharmaceutical Insurance in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, 37
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 779, 782–83 (2012); cf. Hathaway, supra note 147, at 642–43
(using the term “windows of opportunity” in the context of path dependency in
litigation and the legal system).
165 Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures:
Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL.
341, 365 (2007).
166 Jacob Katz Cogan, Book Review, 105 A M . J. I NT ’ L L. 844, 847–48 (2011)
(reviewing PAUL F. DIEHL & CHARLOTTE KU, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2010)).
167 Pierson, supra note 23, at 78–79.
168 See for example, New York’s Governor, Andrew Cuomo, and Mayor,
Michael Bloomberg, making front-page headlines warning that global warming will
continue to cause major flooding in the United States after Hurricane Sandy wreaked
havoc in New York and New Jersey in late 2012. See Paul M. Barrett, It’s Global
Warming, Stupid: If Hurricane Sandy Doesn’t Persuade Americans to Get Serious
About Climate Change, Nothing Will, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-01/its-global-warming-stupid
[https://perma.cc/G9YM-RLGQ].
169 See Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
170 See Dean Catino, Will Health Care Hurt Boomers’ Retirement?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 24, 2012), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutualfund-investor/2012/09/24/will-health-care-hurt-boomers-retirement [https://perma.cc/EW
H5-728N].
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incentives.171 These incentives included accelerated cost recovery
for capital expenditures and depletion deferral.172 The financial
health of next generation’s investors may not be as dependent on
the success of fossil fuels, rendering it easier to shape the path.
Despite the traditional strength of investing in oil and
gas production, new investments in clean energy are actually
surpassing new investments in fossil fuels.173 In 2010, private
investors and investment firms dedicated $243 billion in new
dollars toward the development of clean energy and carbon
markets, a 30% increase from the previous year.174 Many top
firms in the investment world, like Goldman Sachs, Sullivan &
Cromwell, and Riverstone Holdings, are putting money behind
the “low-carbon economy.”175 Besides seeing huge potential in
“cleantech,” economists and investors are beginning to realize
that fossil-fuel investments carry with them many negative
environmental externalities.176 Although these investors are
still most interested in the bottom line, prior to the 2016
election of Donald Trump, investments in fossil fuels were
predicted to keep dropping while investments in clean energy
were expected to double again in four years, reaching an
estimated annual value of $395 billion in 2020 and $460 billion
in 2030.177 In sum, a blend of the financial environment, status
forecasts, and investor attitudes have fostered the creation of
new funds focused on the alternative energy sector and have
supported the growth of returns garnered by those funds.178
These forecasts for the future of clean tech markets are
hindered by the recent fracking boom and the election of Trump.
Advancements in drilling techniques have led to a resurgence of

171 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41227, ENERGY TAX
POLICY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AND CURRENT STATUS OF ENERGY TAX
EXPENDITURES 2–3 (2010).
172 Id.
173 Renewable Power Trumps Fossil Fuels for First Time, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/25/business/la-fi-renewables-20111125 [https://
perma.cc/SU34-YDGZ].
174 Bloomberg New Energy Finance Names Top Clean Energy Investors,
POLLUTION ONLINE (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.pollutiononline.com/doc/bloomberg-newenergy-finance-names-top-clean-0001 [https://perma.cc/4NX6-4VTK].
175 See id.
176 Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the
United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1663–67 (2011).
177 Spending on New Renewable Energy Capacity to Total $7 Trillion over Next
20 Years, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.bnef.com/Press
Releases/view/173 [https://perma.cc/LT7Y-84PW].
178 Harris
Roen, Uncovering Green Alternative Energy Mutual Funds,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
articles/2015/01/uncovering-green-alternative-energy-mutual-funds.html [https://perma.
cc/785F-WRX9].
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domestic natural gas production179 and corresponding
investments in natural gas reservoirs such as the Marcellus and
Haynesville Shales.180 Some reports estimate that domestic
investments in fossil fuels will continue to remain strong, and
may reach as much as $70 billion in natural gas alone.181 These
reports are likely to be confirmed by a Trump administration that
is extremely supportive of the fossil fuel industry.182
The strength of this logic shift will depend on many
factors. Investors and key players in natural gas do not
necessarily believe that more resources will lead to great price
stability or lower prices in the long run.183 Even Goldman Sachs
admitted that one of its major decisions—a $4 billion unsecured
bridge loan to Chesapeake Energy—may have been a “bust.”184
Instead, investors are more attracted to the long-term benefits of
projects that increase energy efficiency or utilize clean energy
technology.185 One McKinsey analyst noted that with the right
spending, not only could investors generate sufficient returns, but
179 Kevin Bullis, Shale Gas Will Fuel a U.S. Manufacturing Boom, MIT TECH.
REV. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/509291/shale-gas-will-fuela-us-manufacturing-boom/ [https://perma.cc/2XXD-UJN8].
180 Peter Kelly-Detwiler, Driven by Oil Shale Economics, Natural Gas Prices
Primed for Slow and Steady Rise, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2012,), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
peterdetwiler/2012/12/03/driven-by-oil-shale-economics-natural-gas-prices-primed-forslow-and-steady-rise/.
181 Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, After the Boom in Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/business/energy-environment/in-anatural-gas-glut-big-winners-and-losers.html [https://perma.cc/3KVZ-YZAY].
182 See Juliet Eilperin et al., The Oil and Gas Industry Is Quickly Amassing
Power in Trump’s Washington, WASH. POST. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/the-oil-and-gas-industry-is-quickly-amassing-power-in-trumps-washington/
2016/12/14/0d4b26e2-c21c-11e6-9578-0054287507db_story.html?utm_term=.7f7d3b9916bc
[https://perma.cc/4E4A-3ENH]. The Trump administration has secured the appointment of
Scott Pruitt as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, an individual
with significant ties to the fossil fuel industry. Brady Dennis, Judge Orders EPA Nominee
Pruitt to Release Emails with Oil, Gas, Coal Industry, CHI. TRIBUNE (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-scott-pruitt-epa-emails-2017021
6-story.html.
183 See RACHEL YOUNG ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
SAVING MONEY AND REDUCING RISK: HOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENHANCES THE BENEFITS
OF THE NATURAL GAS BOOM 14 (2012), http://aceee.org/files/pdf/white-paper/savingmoney-reducing-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/G47Y-BSYG].
184 Krauss & Lipton, supra note 181.
185 Id.; Amory B. Lovins & Jon Creyts, Hot Air About Cheap Natural Gas,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. OUTLET (Sept. 6, 2012), http://blog.rmi.org/blog_hot_air_about_
cheap_natural_gas [https://perma.cc/Q7YM-UCGW] (“Energy efficiency and renewables
eliminate fuel price risk. Efficiency opportunities abound worldwide wherever people and
economic activity are (especially where growth is fastest, since it’s easier to build right
than fix later). Efficiency has compelling economics today and an untapped potential far
exceeding our newfound gas bounty. Renewables are similarly available in massive
quantities and increasingly at competitive cost, so starting in 2008 they’ve captured half
the world’s market in new generating capacity. In 2011, non-hydro renewables won $225
billion of global private investment, added 84 billion watts of capacity, and invested their
trillionth dollar since 2004.”).
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could also cut the world’s energy demand in half and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.186
Furthermore, an educated younger populace that
invests in clean energy as opposed to fossil fuel energy may not
be so conflicted and locked-in to the fossil fuel path. Dozens of
student-run divestment campaigns across the country are
urging administrators to transition to more socially responsible
investments.187 At the request of concerned students, faculty,
and alumni,188 over thirty colleges and universities have
committed to full or partial divestment189 away from coal, oil,
and gas companies. Universities like Georgetown and CalArts190
have committed to partial divestment by reducing investments
supporting coal,191 while others such as the Rhode Island School
of Design192 and New School in New York193 have voted for full
divestment. One of the largest divestment campaigns may be
the University of Hawaii’s plans to fully divest by 2018.194
Dozens of other universities have student groups actively
petitioning in divestment campaigns that have rapidly spread
from a few campuses to hundreds of institutions worldwide in

186 Diana Farrell & Jaana K. Remes, How the World Should Invest in Energy
Efficiency, MCKINSEY Q., July 2008, at 1, http://web.mit.edu/cron/Backup/project/urbansustainability/Old%20files%20from%20summer%202009/Ingrid/Urban%20Sustainability%
20Initiative.Data/2008JulyMcKinsey_EEinvestment.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9XQ-TRWU].
187 Nearby Petitions, FOSSIL FREE, https://campaigns.gofossilfree.org/petitions/
near/new?category=fossil-fuel-divestment-colleges-universities [https://perma.cc/Q4LMFND9].
188 See
Alumni,
DIVEST
HARVARD,
http://divestharvard.com/alumni/
[https://perma.cc/WFY2-SSBM]; Organizing Pledge Project, FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT
STUDENT NETWORK, http://www.studentsdivest.org/organizing_pledge [https://perma.
cc/DDB5-4WD9]; Theodore R. Delwiche, Vermont Harvard Club Endorses Divestment,
HARV. CRIMSON (Dec. 25, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/12/25/vermontharvard-club-endorses-divestment/ [https://perma.cc/AA4E-JWN9].
189 Divestment Commitments, FOSSIL FREE, http://gofossilfree.org/commitments/
[https://perma.cc/D7V9-65TR].
190 Soleil David, CalArts Moves to Divest from Fossil Fuel, CALARTS (Dec. 23,
2014), http://blog.calarts.edu/2014/12/23/calarts-moves-to-divest-from-fossil-fuels/ [https://
perma.cc/LW4M-BCYA].
191 Georgetown
Divests from Direct Investments in Coal Companies,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. (June 4, 2015), https://www.georgetown.edu/news/sustainabilitypolicy-regarding-investments.html [https://perma.cc/9BR4-AQJE].
192 RISD to Divest From Fossil-Fuel Companies, ECORI NEWS (June 1, 2015),
http://www.ecori.org/green-groups/2015/6/1/risd-to-divest-from-fossil-fuel-companies [https://
perma.cc/8QPU-MTRV].
193 John Schwartz, The New School Divests Fossil Fuel Stock and Refocuses on
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/
science/the-new-school-takes-a-big-step-beyond-divesting-fossil-fuel-stock.html [https://
perma.cc/LGP6-A2ZA].
194 Brodie, UH System Divests from Fossil Fuels, 350 HAW. (May 21, 2015),
http://350hawaii.org/?p=274&utm_content=bufferb794a&utm_medium=social&utm_so
urce=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer [https://perma.cc/6WKK-VW65].
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less than a decade.195 As the next generation’s investments shift
to include a share of clean technology infrastructure, so too
may the associated attitudes towards path divergence.
Despite these suggestions to change the logic, “[m]ost
regulation has proven remarkably unyielding to evolution, even
in the face of recognition of its limits and flaws.”196 Accordingly,
although deserving of more space than is available here, it also
must be noted that another option is not to change the logic, but
to change the organizations (e.g., utilities) themselves. Some
consumers are pursuing this approach, defecting from their
utilities that are too beholden to the fossil fuel paths. The most
high-profile example is Boulder, Colorado, which has been
pushing for years to emancipate itself from the utility Xcel in
favor of forming its own municipality committed to more clean
energy investments. The Colorado PUC ruled in November of
2015 that Boulder cannot acquire Xcel facilities that exclusively
serve customers outside city limits, but it is allowing a
supplemental application for the city to acquire some facilities.197
“Boulder’s [municipality] would be the first established to
increase clean energy and combat climate pollution.”198 Initially,
the city planned to retire “coal for existing natural gas capacity
and then develop and buy more renewable power over time.”199
The utility would then reinvest its profits in solar and other clean
energy initiatives like energy efficiency. Although investor-owned
utilities have been the dominant organization in the electricity

195 Rapid Increase in Institutions Pulling Money Out of Fossil Fuels, FOSSIL
FREE (Sept. 23, 2014), http://gofossilfree.org/press-release/rapid-increase-in-institutionspulling-money-out-of-fossil-fuels/ [https://perma.cc/2VXX-GS99]; ARABELLA ADVISORS,
MEASURING THE GLOBAL FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT, http://www.arabella
advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Measuring-the-Global-Divestment-Movement.
pdf [https://perma.cc/77DL-9XKQ]. But see RACHELLE PETERSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF
SCHOLARS, INSIDE DIVESTMENT: THE ILLIBERAL MOVEMENT TO TURN A GENERATION
AGAINST FOSSIL FUELS 32 (2015), https://www.nas.org/images/documents/NAS_inside
Divestment_fullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA3Y-7RZX] (noting that Harvard, Vassar
College, Cornell University, Colorado College, Bryn Mawr College, Middlebury College,
the City University of New York, and Haverford College have rejected divestment).
196 Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 L. INNOVATION &
TECH. 75, 75 (2009).
197 Erica Meltzer, PUC: Boulder Can’t Take Xcel Facilities that Only Serve
Customers Outside City, DAILY CAMERA BOULDER NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.
dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_29068182/puc-boulder-cant-take-xcel-facilities-thatonly [https://perma.cc/KZB5-HDYL].
198 Maria Gallucci, Boulder Likely to Adopt Its Own Green Utility—and Risks
of Going Solo, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/20130120/clean-energy-renewable-energy-climate-change-global-warming-bouldermunicipalization-xcel-energy-coal-germany [https://perma.cc/FNS3-4AYA].
199 Id.
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sphere for decades, they may need to reinvent themselves in the
face of municipalities and customer-driven resources.200
B.

Reduce Positive Feedback Effects of Fossil Fuel

Just as network effects suggest that the value of a
connected system increases as more people use it, the contrary
should also be true. As the amount of fossil fuel infrastructure
decreases, the value of the system should similarly decrease.
Given the extensive investments in fossil fuel infrastructure, it
is unlikely that fossil fuel developers would voluntarily
reevaluate whether their fossil fuel investment continues to
make long-term financial sense or voluntarily relinquish their
operating rights.201 On the contrary, fossil fuel developers may
be even more determined to keep their older plants operating
now that the initial investments have been recouped and they
are operating at higher profit levels.
If the law intervened to change that financial calculus,
the positive feedback effects of fossil fuel infrastructure may be
diminished. In many ways, this is similar to efforts to enhance
negative feedback effects of fossil fuels.202 Not surprisingly,
researchers found that resource environments marked by scarcity
and crisis were more conducive to changes in institutional logic.203
Rather than wait for scarcity of fossil fuel resources and crisis,
this section will explore four mechanisms that foster path
divergence of fossil fuel paths by creating windows of opportunity
for reevaluation of the existing path and by increasing the costs
of continuing on the fossil fuel path.
First, the law could help foster path divergence by
shortening the licensing periods for fossil fuel infrastructure,
triggering more frequent reevaluations.204 Many licensing
200 Id.; see, e.g., Matias Alonso, Reinventing the Utility in a Time of Disruption,
ACCENTURE UTILS. BLOG (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/blogsreinventing-utility-time-disruption [https://perma.cc/8JX8-WPXX] (Accenture blog created
to help utilities reinvent themselves).
201 Ferrey, supra note 153, at 126 (noting the practical difficulties in
substituting an “in place . . . fossil-fired unit which has reached the end of its useful life
with a renewable unit”).
202 Negative feedback “raises the relative costs (or reduces the relative
benefits) of the status quo” for politically influential actors. Alan M. Jacobs & R. Kent
Weaver, Policy Feedback and Policy Change 3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Data_Integrity_Notice.cfm?abid=1642636.
203 Wesley D. Sine & Robert J. David, Environmental Jolts, Institutional
Change, and the Creation of Entrepreneurial Opportunity in the US Electric Power
Industry, 32 RES. POL’Y 185, 187 (2003).
204 This is particularly important as our energy infrastructure ages. As of
2010, about 73% of all coal-generated electricity, and 27% of all natural gas-generated
electricity, was created by generators over 30 years old. Age of Electric Power
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regimes allow for operation of energy facilities for long periods of
time.205 In fact, several states offer lifetime licenses for fossil fuel
power plants even though the plants are still subject to federal
statutes and regulations.206 Several states, including the four
most populous—California, Texas, Florida, and New York—all
provide what is essentially a one-stop shop for utility companies.
They can obtain near-impenetrable licenses that supersede local
ordinances and other state regulations.207 State laws require
minimal nameplate capacities208 and compliance with
environmental restrictions,209 making the barriers to entry are
quite low for fossil fuels. It should be noted, however, that the
same nameplate capacity requirements can prove burdensome
for renewable energy developers, some of whom find it difficult
to obtain sufficient land to qualify.210
Generators Varies Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2011), https://www.eia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=1830 [https://perma.cc/Z4R2-BU8Z].
205 For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) delegates
several areas of jurisdictional responsibility to state public utility commissions, including
the “physical construction of electric generation facilities” and regulation of retail sales of
electricity and natural gas to consumers. However, FERC does “[r]egulate[ ] the
transmission and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce.” What FERC Does,
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp [https://
perma.cc/RP4U-S3JM].
206 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R pt. 70 (2016) (a fossil fuel power plant must obtain Title V
Operating Permits under the Clean Air Act if the plant exceeds thresholds for various air
pollutants); see also Who Has to Obtain a Title V Permit?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/title-voperating-permits/who-has-obtain-title-v-permit [https://perma.cc/2YXD-W3TA].
207 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, §§ 1701–1770 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 403.506
(2016); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 160–173 (2011); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25.101,
25.109, 25.5(82) (2016).
208 A fossil fuel power plant must have a nameplate capacity of at least 50
megawatts (MW) in California, Energy Facilities Siting/Licensing Process, CAL.
ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/#license [https://perma.cc/VV5
E-KER7], 75MW in Florida, FLA. STAT. § 403.506 (2016), 25MW in New York, New
York’s One-Stop Power Facility Siting Process Has Arrived, CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP
(Aug. 2012), http://www.cullenanddykman.com/news-advisories-35.html [https://perma.
cc/G4K9-LPJJ], and 10MW in Texas, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.101(a)(2) (2016).
209 See E. Gail Suchman, Power-Plant-Siting: Efforts to Amend Article X Fail,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.stroock.com/siteFiles/Pub539.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FWK9-VYR4] (explaining why power producers and environmental justice groups
favored competing power plant siting legislation in the New York Assembly and Senate
in 2007); . see e.g., New NYS Article 10 Powerplant Siting Statute, CULLEN & DYKMAN
LLP (Sept. 2011) http://www.cullenanddykman.com/news-advisories-25.html [https://
perma.cc/6H4V-2XJ8] (New York’s 2007 legislative battle to amend Article 10 of the
Public Service Law, debating the proper nameplate capacity required for a lifetime license to
ensure utility companies would be accountable to the environmental standards).
210 Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate
Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy
Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 1128, 1132, 1140–41 (2012). Furthermore, due to the land
constraints associated with solar and wind power plants, renewable energy producers
may find their power plant proposals invoke both federal and state jurisdiction. Id. at
1140. For example, offshore wind power plants on the Outer Continental Shelf must
satisfy BOEM’s federal regulations to secure a lease for construction of the turbines in
the ocean and states’ regulations for the transmission lines connecting the wind
turbines to the land. Id. at 1141; see, e.g., General Overview of Regulations for
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State licensing procedures can further disadvantage
renewable energy projects as compared to fossil fuel plants.211
Those who do not qualify for one-stop shop licensing must
obtain numerous permits from local, state, and federal
agencies, increasing the various costs associated with power
plant siting.212 Two options to reduce the path dependencies
associated with fossil fuels are to either reduce the overall
nameplate capacity requirement for all power plants, or to
create a reduced nameplate capacity requirement for
renewable energy power plants to encourage producers to
invest in renewable energy infrastructure through the more
efficient one-stop shop licensing process.
In addition to state licensing, the federal government
can also pay more heed to licensing periods. The federal
government is in charge of nuclear and hydropower licenses,
both of which are valid for decades, with options to renew for
additional twenty-year timeframes.213 For example, the Atomic

Renewable Energy Facilities in Florida, FL. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/
siting/files/renew_resource_permitting.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ6P-QKEZ] (applying
Florida’s Power Plant Siting Act to renewable energy power plants); CAL. ENERGY
COMM’N, RENEWABLE ENERGY–OVERVIEW 21, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/
tracking_progress/documents/renewable.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LLH-ZQTH] (last updated
Dec. 22, 2016) (applying California’s Energy Commission licensing of power plants to
renewable energy power plants).
211 See Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the
Renewable Energy Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293, 296 (2014) (“Current
solar technologies require approximately seven acres per MW, whereas a large gasfired power plant would require 0.06 acres per MW.” (footnote omitted)); NUCLEAR
ENERGY INST., LAND REQUIREMENTS FOR CARBON-FREE TECHNOLOGIES 1–2 (2015),
http://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/Policy/Papers/Land_Use_Carbon_Fre
e_Technologies.pdf?ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9GF-VCGQ] (“A 1,000-MW wind farm
would require approximately 85,240 acres of land . . . . A 1,000-MW solar photovoltaic
(PV) facility would require about 8,900 acres . . . . For comparison, the land area
required for 1,000 MW of nuclear capacity is approximately 1.3 square miles.”).
212 See General Overview of Regulations for Renewable Energy Facilities in
Florida, supra note 210 (outlining permits required for Florida renewable energy power
plants that do not qualify for one-stop shop licensing); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra
note 210, at 17–20, 21 (“The Energy Commission’s 12-month, one-stop permitting
process is a certified regulatory program under the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) and includes many opportunities for public participation. Although
coordinated with all applicable state, local, and regional agencies, the Energy
Commission’s certification addresses all CEQA requirements for new power plants
under its jurisdiction and is in-lieu of all permits otherwise required by local, regional,
or state agencies.” (emphasis added)); Morris & Owley, supra note 211, at 312–14.
213 Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-rene
wal.html [https://perma.cc/X99V-PU34] (last updated Apr. 29, 2016); Applications for
Original Licenses, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/
hydropower/gen-info/licensing/app-org.asp [https://perma.cc/5DJW-Z6NB] (last updated
Jan. 11, 2017); Applications for New Licenses (Relicenses), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/app-new.asp
[https://perma.cc/E69A-X5YV] (last updated Nov. 21, 2016). Nuclear licenses are valid
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Energy Act grants the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
the authority to license nuclear power plants for up to forty
years, and the power plant can renew its license every twenty
years thereafter.214 Aging infrastructure and budget constraints
have resulted in significant amounts of infrastructure
operating even beyond these lengthy periods.215 Within the
existing regime, these license expirations are windows of
opportunity to reevaluate the existing path. But by shortening
the licensing and renewal periods, the government can increase
the windows of opportunity and help to temper the lock-in
effect realized by existing policies. An alternative regime that
would base licensing periods on the time it takes to recoup the
initial investments plus a reasonable profit may create more
frequent windows of opportunity for reevaluation.216 Additionally,
fossil fuel power plant siting and licensing legislation could be
remodeled so that the licenses are more finite in nature. States
can mirror the federal model of nuclear power plant licensing or
establish their own models to limit the license duration of fossil
fuel power plants.
In addition to shorter licensing periods, sunset provisions
can serve to limit investments in fossil fuel production. Sunset
provisions are statutory tools that nullify a statute after a
certain period of time.217 Sunset provisions have been
particularly harmful to investment in renewable energy,218 and
one such provision was attached to the Production Tax Credit
(PTC)—created by Congress in 1992—providing investors a tax
credit of 2.2 cents per kilowatt-hour produced by renewable
energy.219 By the same token, sunset provisions for renewables
need to be removed. Scholars in the renewable energy industry
tend to agree that sunset provisions attached to the PTC limited
for forty years, Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal, supra, and hydropower
licenses are valid for thirty-fifty years, Applications for Original Licenses, supra.
214 Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal, supra note 213.
215 See, e.g., Mark Chediak & Jonathan Crawford, Exelon Will Seek License to
Run Nuclear Plant for 80 Years, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2016-06-06/exelon-said-to-seek-license-to-run-nuclear-plant-for-80years [https://perma.cc/3SYZ-YVVS] (describing how Exelon Corporation wants to renew
its licenses for two reactors for another twenty years, making these two reactors the first
to be granted a lifespan longer than sixty years and as long as eighty years).
216 Such windows might allow for more public reconsideration of past energy
decisions of the type that occurred over the licensing renewable of the Vermont Yankee
nuclear power plant in 2012. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Closure in 2014 Will
Challenge New England Energy Markets, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12851 [https://perma.cc/XP9Q-G5MX].
217 Erin Dewey, Note, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset
Provisions Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1105, 1120 (2011).
218 Id. at 1120–21.
219 Id. at 1115–16.
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investment in the renewable energy sector because investors
were not assured renewable energy would be produced before
the tax credit expired, or “sunsetted,” negating the investor’s tax
credit benefit.220 Critics of sunset provisions would agree that
sunset provisions create uncertainty in investment.221
Not surprisingly, two modifications would affect the
path of the electric grid. First, Congress can establish more
long-term tax credits for renewables. Organizations that have
tracked the history of the federal PTC for wind, with its onagain, off-again approach, have correlated drops in investment
with the years the PTC expired. Second, the fossil fuel industry
should be subject to the same type of sunset provisions for their
established tax credits and tax deductions for the fossil fuel
industry. The federal and state governments can theoretically
create the same regulatory and financial uncertainty in fossil fuel
investment as Congress did with renewable energy investment
through the PTC sunset provision.
A second way for the law to foster path divergence is by
eliminating grandfathering of existing infrastructure. Others
have evaluated the numerous ways the law creates perverse
incentives that reward existing facilities that continue operating
under often outdated and inefficient processes.222 “Experience in
the U.S. demonstrates that older fossil-fired power plants, at the
conclusion of their originally scheduled lives, typically are
refitted with new burners, boilers, and fuel-handling equipment
and extended for additional decades.”223 Much of environmental
law, for example, imposes more stringent requirements on new
facilities than on existing facilities.224 One of the most blatant
examples may be the Clean Air Act’s treatment of existing
sources under the New Source Review Program. So long as a
facility is not significantly modified, it remains under less
rigorous regulatory requirements, creating an incentive to keep
the older infrastructure operating for as long as it can. This
increases the cost of moving forward with new infrastructure.
Eliminating preferential treatment for existing infrastructure
Id. at 1125–27.
Id. at 1122–23.
222 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1015 (2010) (arguing that the federal actor should sometimes preempt state actors
when federal regulation or no federal regulation would produce better results than the
state system in place).
223 Ferrey, supra note 153, at 125.
224 See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) and Federal Facilities, EPA (June 14, 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/clean-air-act-caa-and-federal-facilities [https://perma.cc/
EA2V-NH4E] (The Clean Air Act provides for “more stringent control technology and
permitting requirements for new sources” than existing sources.).
220
221

596

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

may eliminate the disincentives to develop “new” facilities,
thereby freeing developers from maintaining their existing path,
and allowing them to invest in new facilities.
Third, the law can ratchet up the standards applicable to
fossil fuel infrastructure and remove subsidies. Instead of
perfunctory renewals that perpetuate the existing paths, licensing
authorities can take a more critical, substantive look at the
renewal applications for existing fossil fuel infrastructure. One
example may be EPA’s rules regarding greenhouse gas emissions
standards for fossil-fuel-fired boilers.225 By ratcheting up the
standards based on natural gas plants, the rule effectively
mandates that all new fossil fuel (i.e., nonrenewable) plants
must be natural gas, resulting in a potential phase-out of coal
and oil plants.226 If the cost of upgrading or building new
infrastructure to meet more stringent renewal standards
becomes more expensive, the differential between the new clean
energy infrastructure and maintaining the old one is reduced.
Fourth, the government can make it more costly to invest
in oil and gas development. The Obama administration, for
instance, took several steps to better account for the costs of
extracting fossil fuels on public lands and to ensure the public is
receiving payments that better reflect the externalities. First, it
proposed to raise its hundred-year-old federal royalty rates in
the fiscal 2014 budget. The federal royalty rate established by
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 remains at 12.5%,227 one that
has never successfully been raised for the last 96 years.228
Then, in 2015, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) issued a proposed rule to explore adjusting the royalty
rate, updating annual rental payments, minimum acceptable bids
(currently $1.50 to $2 per acre), and bonding requirements.229 All
225 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Stationary Sources; Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
226 EPA acknowledges that coal plants could satisfy the new standards with
the installation of carbon capture and sequestration, a largely unproven technology on
a commercial scale. Id.
227 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) (2012).
228 In 2013, President Obama’s $11.4 billion budget request for the U.S.
Department of the Interior sought swifter permits for oil and gas wells on public lands but
would have also imposed higher royalties and new fees for nonproducing leaseholders. U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 132–34, (2013), https://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/D
T9S-T5MH]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LAND AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT (2013), http://
www.eenews.net/assets/2013/04/10/document_gw_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PYS-SN2J].
229 Oil and Gas Leasing; Royalty on Production, Rental Payments, Minimum
Acceptable Bids, Bonding Requirements, and Civil Penalty Assessments, 43 C.F.R. pt. 3100
(2015); see also 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). In Alaska, the maximum amount of land
that can be leased is increased from the standard 2560 acres to 5760 acres. Id.
§ 226(b)(1)(A).
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six western states with large amounts of federal land impose
higher royalty rates than the federal government.230 According to
the Center for Western Priorities, if the federal royalty rate was
raised to 16.67% or 18.75%, an additional $400 to $600 million
would be generated in revenue.231 The Congressional Budget
Office projected a more modest $50 to $200 million in
revenue.232 President Obama’s budget requests related to oil,
gas, and coal development would have raised about $3 billion
over the next decade.233 In January of 2016, congressmen again
introduced a bill amending the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 by
raising the royalty rate to 18.75% and the leasing bid price to $4
per acre, but it failed to reach a full House vote.234 Six additional
bills have been introduced in the House, and three in the Senate,
seeking to amend the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.235 Most
recently, President Obama issued a rulemaking to try to close a
regulatory loophole that allowed coal companies to sell coal to
their own subsidiaries at depressed prices to avoid royalty
payments.236 The end result of any of these proposals is to try to
reflect a truer cost of fossil fuels as compared to the status quo.237
230 CTR. FOR W. PRIORITIES, A FAIR SHARE: THE CASE FOR UPDATING FEDERAL
ROYALTIES 6–7 (2013), http://westernpriorities.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/A-FairShare.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAK7-6CJA] (Six western states with large amounts of
federal land—North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico—
impose royalty rates between 16.67% and 18.75%, and Texas imposes a rate of 25%.).
231 Id. at 10.
232 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., OPTIONS FOR INCREASING FEDERAL INCOME FROM
CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS ON FEDERAL LANDS 3 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51421-oil_and_gas_options-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C9BV-E9JZ].
233 Phil Taylor, Budget Request Seeks Mandatory Conservation Funding,
Increased Fees for Oil and Gas, GREENWIRE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/2013/04/10/stories/1059979222.
234 H.R. 4389, 114th Cong. (2016); Press Release, Congressman Lowenthal,
Legislation Will Ensure American Public Is Fairly Compensated for Oil and Gas
Extraction from Public Lands (Jan. 13, 2016), http://lowenthal.house.gov/news/document
single.aspx?DocumentID=398711 [https://perma.cc/29U3-E49D].
235 H.R. 3881, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 3682, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3289, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R. 3140, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1930, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1487,
114th Cong. (2015); S. 1340, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1041, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 791, 114th
Cong. (2015). For seemingly every proposal, there is a legislative champion defending the
status quo. See, for example, a bill introduced on March 18, 2015, by Senator Ted Cruz (of
Texas), that seeks to keep the royalty rate and leasing bid price at the current rates while
streamlining the permitting process and allowing a permit to satisfy various federal
environmental statutory regulations, id., and a proposed amendment from Representative
Ryan Zinke (Republican from Montana), to block the Obama administration from
implementing its forthcoming rule to protect the coal companies’ rights to dodge royalty
payments, Nicole Gentile, Congressman Tries to Quietly Preserve Coal Loophole,
THINKPROGRESS (June 30, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/congressman-tries-to-quietlypreserve-coal-loophole-e1b65af71f36#.vuf1y8wob [https://perma.cc/7NNH-T8Z4].
236 See 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206 (2016); Gentile, supra note 235.
237 See generally U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 232; Peter Erickson &
Michael Lazarus, How Would Phasing Out U.S. Federal Leases for Fossil Fuel Extractions
Affect CO2 Emissions and 2°C Goals? (Stockholm Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 2016-02,
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Similarly, the royalties and leasing bid prices for
renewables should be adjusted to reflect their true costs. As with
fossil fuels, renewables pay both a land rent and a royalty fee.
Solar developers pay a per megawatt royalty fee, meaning a
project pays more, the higher its capacity factor.238 The BLM set
the megawatt capacity fees at “$5,256 per MW for photovoltaic
(PV) solar projects; $6,570 per MW for concentrated PV and
concentrated solar power [CSP] . . . and $7,884 per MW for
[CSP] projects with storage capacity of three hours or more.”239
BLM has approved almost 17,000 megawatts of renewable
capacity on public lands, all generating capacity fees.240 The
government’s use of a per megawatt approach for renewables
makes it difficult to directly compare the costs with fossil fuels,
and a more appropriate comparison may be to compare the fees
as a percentage of the company’s profits.
C.

Increase Positive Feedback Effects of Clean Energy

A final way the law can facilitate a shift from fossil fuel
to clean energy infrastructure is by increasing the positive
feedback effects of clean energy. The massive retirements of
outdated and pollution-intensive infrastructure, particularly
coal, reflect an opportunity to shape a different path. In 2015,
nearly 14 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired generation was retired,
equating to more than 80% of all retired capacity for the year.241
The other 20% of retired capacity for 2015 stemmed mostly from
natural gas/oil-fired generation.242 Furthermore, the Energy
Information Administration analysts predict, based on the EIA’s
Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan,243 between
90GW and 101GW of coal-fired generation, and between 62GW
2016),
https://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/
SEI-WP-2016-02-US-fossilfuel-leases.pdf [https://perma.cc/W75B-QE6M].
238 This also creates a disincentive to combine energy storage with these
facilities, a move that would raise the capacity factor.
239 Memorandum from Robert V. Abbey, Director of U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
Bureau of Land Mgmt., to All Field Officials (June 10, 2010) (on file with the Brooklyn
Law Review).
240 Renewable Energy Projects Approved Since the Beginning of Calendar Year
2009, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/wo/st/
en/prog/energy/renewable_energy/Renewable_Energy_Projects_Approved_to_Date.html
[https://perma.cc/J9CH-S6DY].
241 Coal Made Up More Than 80% of Retired Electricity Generating Capacity
in 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=25272 [https://perma.cc/72MY-FJQS] (the retired coal-fired generating
capacity came primarily from conventional steam coal).
242 Id.
243 See Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (May 22, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/
[https://perma.cc/5ATJ-K83L].
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and 74GW of natural gas/oil-fired generation, will be retired by
2040.244 These numbers may need to be adjusted in light of
President Trump’s pro-coal policies,245 but low natural gas prices
will continue to push coal out of the market.
Many of the existing nuclear plants, in contrast, appear
to be more durable. As of April 2016, 88% of operating nuclear
power reactors have been granted a renewed license, ensuring
the country’s nuclear infrastructure will reach at least sixty
years old.246 Due to the nuclear operators’ ability to replace what
experts formerly thought were irreplaceable components of
nuclear reactors, experts are now considering whether “80 is the
new 40” regarding nuclear reactors’ lifespans.247 The experts
appear to hint at the conclusion that the licenses will be
renewed for a second time.248 New nuclear power plants face a
much more difficult time, with high costs and uncertainty
suggesting they may only be feasible in traditional, verticallyintegrated parts of the country and government-owned facilities,
incapable of competing in the two-thirds of the country governed
by competitive markets and low clearing prices.249 The only new
nuclear reactors being constructed in the last forty years are in

244 These figures are based on the EIA’s projections under its Clean Power
Plan (CPP) Base Policy and CPP Extension case studies, which are only two of eight
case studies performed. For all eight case studies and figures, see Proposed Clean
Power Plan Would Accelerate Renewable Additions and Coal Plant Retirements, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 5, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=
21532 [https://perma.cc/U7ZY-ULTE].
245 See generally Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.J. Resolution 38 (Feb. 16,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/16/remarks-president-trumpsigning-hj-resolution-38 [https://perma.cc/TYF6-6LY5] (“Well, Mr. President, you know
that the last eight years brought a depression—a depression—to Eastern Kentucky,
and our folks are so excited to have a pro-coal President.”); Leigh Paterson & Reid
Frazier, Coal Country Picked Trump. Now, It Wants Him to Keep His Promises, NPR
(Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/01/507693919/coal-country-picked-trump-nowthey-want-him-to-keep-his-promises [https://perma.cc/Q8HH-BAF6].
246 Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PDE6-E8G2] (last updated Apr. 12, 2017); see also Backgrounder on
Reactor License Renewal, supra note 213.
247 See Paul Voosen, As Nuclear Reactor Fleets Ages, Engineers Ask, ‘Is 80 the New
40?’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/11/20/20greenwire-asnuclear-reactor-fleet-ages-engineers-ask-is-94897.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/G8
YY-Y6ME].
248 Id.
249 Robert Walton, NEI: More than a Dozen Plants ‘At Risk’ of Early Closure,
UTIL. DIVE (May 23, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nei-more-than-a-dozennuclear-plants-at-risk-of-early-closure/419651/ [https://perma.cc/J5G6-7MGK]; Nuclear
Plant Shutdowns Reveal Market Problems, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://www.nei.
org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Nuclear-Plant-Shutdowns-Reveal-Market-Problems
[https://perma.cc/DQX7-PP8C].
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Georgia, Tennessee, and South Carolina, and many of them
involve schedule delays and cost overruns.250
A first way to increase the positive feedback effects of
renewable energy is for regulators to amend the decision rules
governing electricity decisions.251 Hawaii, for example, is working to
abolish a single rate of return for all utility investments and is
instead trying to differentiate between old fossil fuel generation
and new clean generation. The Hawaii legislature passed Act 37,
which found that “existing regulatory cost recovery mechanisms
neither provide sufficient economic incentives to induce electric
utilities to reduce energy and operating costs nor financially
reward them if these cost reductions are self-initiated and
substantial.”252 As the bill indicates, “[t]he continued operation of
old, inefficient utility fossil generation therefore preserves existing
utility financial returns.”253 Act 37(b) provides that the Hawaii
PUC “shall explicitly consider” four factors when assessing the
reasonableness of utility investments: (1) the effect of fossil fuel
reliance “on price volatility”; (2) “export of funds for fuel imports”;
(3) “fuel supply reliability risk”; and (4) greenhouse gases.254
Iowa also amended its decision rules to abandon the strict
“least cost” requirement. Instead, in determining ratemaking
principles, the board now “shall not be limited to traditional
ratemaking principles or traditional cost recovery mechanisms.”255
To obtain approval from the PUC, a utility must both have an
efficiency plan and have demonstrated to the PUC that it “has
considered other sources for long-term electric supply and that
the facility . . . is reasonable when compared to other feasible
alternative sources of supply.”256 Such changes have facilitated
250 See Max Blau, Will Georgia’s Plant Vogtle Lead to a U.S. Renaissance of
Nuclear Energy?, ATLANTA MAG. (Oct. 2016), http://www.atlantamagazine.com/greatreads/will-georgias-plant-vogtle-lead-u-s-renaissance-nuclear-energy/ [https://perma.cc/B
N72-UXUG]; Daniel Gross, The Half-Life of America’s Nuclear Plants, SLATE (May 16,
2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_juice/2016/05/america_is_getting_new_
nuclear_plants_in_tennessee_and_georgia_we_need_more.html [https://perma.cc/5HUR6NZ9]; Chris Mooney, It’s the First New U.S. Nuclear Reactor in Decades. And Climate
Change Has Made that a Very Big Deal, WASH. POST (June 17, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/06/17/the-u-s-is-powering-up-itsfirst-new-nuclear-reactor-in-decades/?utm_term=.c91d34b9e58f [https://perma.cc/2H7VKKQM].
251 Similarly, some states are ratcheting up the renewable energy requirements,
with Vermont enacting bill H 40 in 2015 to increase retail sales of electricity to 55%
beginning in 2017, to 75% renewable energy by 2032. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 8005 (2016).
252 S.B. 120, 27th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (Currently, investments in
maintaining old fossil fuel generation get the same rate of return as investments made to
modernize the grid).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 IOWA CODE § 476.53(4)(b) (2017).
256 Id. § 476.53(4)(c)(2).
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Iowa’s record-breaking growth of wind resources, a state that was
leading the nation in electricity generated from wind in 2015
(generating 31% of the state’s electricity from wind).257
In addition to legislatures, some PUCs are acting
proactively. For example, on July 11, 2013, the Georgia Public
Service Commission ordered Georgia Power to dramatically
expand its proposed commitment to renewable solar generation
by 2016, despite not having a legislative duty to do so.258 “As a
matter of energy policy,” the order reads, “the Commission
determines that it is appropriate to expand Georgia Power’s
generation portfolio by the addition of 525 MW of new solar
generation. Two hundred sixty (260) MW shall be brought
online in 2015 and the remaining two hundred sixty-five (265)
MW by 2016.”259 Commissioner Tim Echols issued a telling
remark, reported in PV Magazine, explaining that the PSC’s
decision to “add[ ] 525 MW of solar to [its] 20-year energy plan
is a hedge against more coal regulation and natural gas price
volatility.”260 In this instance, the risk adverse nature of energy
stakeholders may evolve to work in favor of clean energy.
A second way to increase the positive feedback effects of
clean energy would involve government acceptance of an
impending learning curve associated with moving toward clean
energy infrastructure. Government intervention can create
alternative “rules of the game” to force stakeholders to adapt
their strategies.261 As universities begin to teach the science
and practice of new technologies, momentum will build around
a growing number of engineers and skilled laborers.262 This also
suggests that patience may be required as clean energy
industries struggle to realize the benefits of learning effects. As
Professor Deeg has stated, “[s]upporting my contention that
increasing returns needed to be cultivated, at least in the
initial phases, is the fact that the payoffs from early reforms
were not that great.”263 Stakeholders will need to make
significant investments in clean energy infrastructure, making
it less costly to reverse course than it is to stay on the existing
257 Donnelle Eller, Iowa Gets 31% of Electricity from Wind, DES MOINES REG.
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/2016/02/29/iowa-gets-31electricity-wind/81115262/ [https://perma.cc/96JY-MQ98].
258 Final Order at 18, Nos. 36498, 36499 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 17, 2013).
259 Id.
260 Cheryl Kaften, Georgia Power Forced to Adopt 525 MW More Solar, PV MAG.
(July 15, 2013), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2013/07/15/georgia-power-forced-to-adopt525-mw-more-solar_100012043/ [https://perma.cc/5469-JZNW].
261 Unruh, supra note 5, at 824.
262 Id.
263 Deeg, supra note 12, at 32.
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one. For this to happen, the energy industry also needs to be
committed to very large investments in the requisite
technology, organizational changes, and human capital for the
clean energy business.
As Professor Deeg has demonstrated with respect to the
German financial markets,264 the investment cannot always
focus on short-term visions. “Importantly, both groups were
relatively profitable during this period and were so largely
because of their traditional retail and commercial business.
Thus, investing resources in securities-related capacities was
as much or more about future expectations than current
market imperatives.”265 A similar mentality needs to apply to
renewable energy. The new path would benefit from a focus on
future expectations and an unwavering commitment if the
payoffs from early reforms are modest.
Although the financial returns of renewable energy may
not be realized in the short-term, nudging the energy industry
toward a clean energy path may lead to a new set of positive
feedback loops, reducing the proactive effort (lobbying) needed
to realize the gains from renewable energy. The more people
become invested in renewable energy, the harder it will be to
shift away. If the law could develop a new path towards clean
energy infrastructure, a return to the old-fossil fuel based
system would become increasingly remote. Positive feedback
mechanisms along the new path would help secure its place.
Some suggest that the inertia created by lock-in can presumably
be overcome with low transition costs to a new system or
practice.266 Subsidized transaction costs and incentives for those
who shift early can facilitate successful transitions to new
technologies.267 Furthermore, a centralized authoritythe
government or even private organizationsdictating standards
may help ensure a “[ ] sufficient number of parties will move to
the new standard” as to make the transition more cost
effective.268 But established standards can easily become
“powerful sources of lock-in on their own.”269 Eventually, those
who invest in the new renewable energy-oriented path should
be rewarded with the same momentum that has propelled
fossil fuel infrastructure to its current level.

264
265
266
267
268
269

Id.at 34.
Id. at 32 n.48.
Gillette, supra note 52, at 819–20.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Unruh, supra note 5, at 822.
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Third, energy stakeholders need to develop more
information to reduce the risk of uncertainty270 and work to
minimize coordination costs. As others have noted, “the generic
problems of escaping from lock-in of the system to a globally
inferior (but locally stable) attractor are rooted in ‘pure’
coordination costs. Such costs may be very high, however,
especially if the individual agents are expected to act
spontaneously under conditions of incomplete information.”271
Information-gathering, patience from government actors, and
amending the decision rules governing electricity decisions are
essential components of a path to increase the positive feedback
effects of clean energy.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that path dependencies exist for the legal
regime governing the electric grid is the easy part. It is no
surprise that “[t]he smoothest regulatory journey is certainly
the one that the utility has already completed.”272 The difficulty
stems from retraining ourselves to push down a new path. In
lieu of a price on carbon,273 the only way for the country to move
forward is to somehow break free of the inertia that propels us
towards risk averse, least cost decisions. This includes
attempts to distribute the benefits of energy resources so they
are not so concentrated in the hands of those with an interest
in fossil fuels, to shift the logic used in energy institutions, and
to cultivate a positive feedback mechanism for clean energy.
Professor Capoccia’s theories on critical juncture suggest
that energy stakeholders may need to be poised and ready for if
and when the structural influences on energy decision-making
become “significantly relaxed,” thereby creating an opportunity
270 “The ‘first best’ public policy role in these matters, therefore, is not necessarily
the making of positive choices, but instead the improvement of the informational state in
which choices can be made by private parties and government agencies.” Paul A. David,
Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for ‘Historical Economics’, in EVOLUTION AND
PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS: PAST AND PRESENT 15 (Pierre Garrouste & Stavros
Ioannides eds., 2001).
271 Id. at 11.
272 Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory
Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1045–47 (1987).
273 Studies show that were there to be a price on carbon, renewable energy
projects may end up being the “least cost alternative.” See MONISHA SHAH ET AL.,
CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL, CLEAN RESTRUCTURING: DESIGN ELEMENTS FOR LOW
CARBON WHOLESALE MARKETS AND BEYOND 7 (2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16ost
i/66105.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9AN-J8G8]; Joseph A. Cullen & Erin T. Mansur, Inferring
Carbon Abatement Costs in Electricity Markets: A Revealed Preference Approach Using
the Shale Revolution (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20795, 2014),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20795.pdf [https://perma.cc/39HL-3LTK].

604

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

for change.274 But this theory presumes patience. This article
takes the more impatient approach of trying to force such
relaxation to broaden the range of choices available in the future.
There are signs of hope. As discussed above, despite the
lower costs and efficiencies of fossil fuel infrastructure,
investments in renewable infrastructure outpaced those of fossil
fuels the past two years.275 The problem lies in absolute
comparisons, however, with fossil fuels nevertheless providing
66% of the country’s electricity needs while renewables provide a
mere 13%.276 The current trajectories suggest that a slow
evolution in the path may be occurring, as a mere ten years ago,
renewable generation was so minimal, it barely registered in
government data.277 As Professor Ferrey has indicated, however,
[i]t is generally acknowledged that because of reasons of dwindling
accessible supply and price, the voracious energy appetites of
humankind will cause a shift to alternative energy sources. This
inevitability presents a technological and economic advantage for
whichever nations build power infrastructure now, at least in part,
around noncarbon fuels.278

As has been noted decades ago, “a regulatory system
structurally hostile to change is almost certainly both dangerous
to the public and harmful to the environment.”279 “If the stakes
are high, as they are likely to be with climate change, it is worth
thinking now about how to avoid going down the wrong path.”280
At the very least, regulators can work to adjust the logic of our
electricity generation decisions, dislodging the “stickiness” that
has had such a firm grip for the last century.

Capoccia & Kelemen, supra note 24, at 343.
Michael Biesecker, U.S. Investment in Renewable Energy Outpaces Fossil
Fuels, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 6, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u-sinvestment-in-renewable-energy-outpaces-fossil-fuels/ [https://perma.cc/PD3A-FLRJ].
276 Electricity in the U.S., ENERGY KIDS, http://www.eia.gov/kids/energy.cfm?
page=electricity_in_the_united_states-basics [https://perma.cc/HZC6-L9Q6].
277 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1995, at 234 fig.8.3
(1996), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038495.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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